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Abstract 
Like its predecessor Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the most recent program for means-
tested public assistance at the federal level, emphasizes work over welfare as a means to 
decrease dependency on government assistance. TANF began at a time when the United 
States was experiencing a robust economy; caseloads decreased and welfare participants 
seemed to be moving from welfare into employment. Now that two decades and one 
Great Recession have passed since TANF’s inception, it is time to examine the 
economy’s role in facilitating welfare participants’ employment prospects. This research 
poses the following question: to what extent do economic conditions (particularly during 
economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, Latino ethnicity, gender, age, 
and education) influence welfare participants’ employment opportunities in terms of 
earnings and work hours? It utilizes secondary data from the Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (MFIP) in Ramsey County, Minnesota, and provides an example of 
one county’s experiences with welfare reform and fluctuating economic conditions. A 
two-level, mixed effects linear regression analysis was done, with time nested in 
individuals, to examine the effects of local and national economic indicators on MFIP 
participants’ employment opportunities. Results indicate that the condition of the local 
economy plays a much greater role in providing such opportunities, than does a national 
recession. Economic indicators used to measure local economic conditions (real GDP for 
the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St.Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, and county-level 
data for median income, unemployment rate, and poverty rate) lag behind indicators used 
to measure national recessions; this indicates a need for proactive programming at the 
 	 v 
state and local levels as the United States enters recessions such that highly economically 
vulnerable members of the community experience the effects of a shrinking economy to a 
much lesser extent. 
 	 vi 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables ix 
  
List of Figures xi 
  
Chapter 1. Introduction 1 
Problem Statement 1 
Research Question 4 
  
Chapter 2. Literature Review 6 
Welfare Reform: History and Policy Context 6 
Literature on TANF Outcomes 10 
Conclusions and Contribution to Existing Research 14 
Table 2.1. Minnesota’s Welfare Reform Goals and Federal Welfare Reform 
Goals 
15 
  
Chapter 3. Theoretical Context and Hypothesis 17 
  
Chapter 4. Methods 21 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 21 
Design 22 
Data: Secondary Data Analysis and Human Subjects Considerations 23 
Population 25 
MFIP-eligible adults 25 
Teen parents who are still in high school and under age 18 28 
Family Stabilization Services participants 29 
MFIP participants whose cash portion is paid with state, rather than federal, 
funds 
30 
MFIP-eligible food-portion-only participants 30 
MFIP participants exempt from Employment Services 31 
Exclusions from the population 32 
Pre-Analysis 33 
Data cleaning 33 
Outliers and errors 35 
Operational definitions of variables 39 
Limitations of variables 42 
Statistical Method: Linear Mixed Effects Models 46 
Descriptive statistics 46 
Justification for mixed effects modeling 48 
Figure 4.1 Nesting Structure 51 
Fitting the first model and testing assumptions 52 
Fitting the final models 53 
Figure 4.2. Three Main Models 54 
Figure 4.3. National Recessions, Local Real GDP, Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate, and Ramsey County Poverty Rate Between 2000 and 
2016 
57 
  
 	 vii 
Figure 4.4. National Recessions, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County 
Median Income Between 2000 and 2016 
59 
Table 4.1 Correlations Between Local Economic Indicators 60 
  
Chapter 5. Findings 70 
Descriptive Statistics 70 
Control variables 71 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics on Race, Latino Ethnicity, and Gender 71 
Dependent variables: income and hours 74 
Mixed Effects Models 75 
Impact of economy on earning income or not 75 
Table 5.2. Local and National Economic Indicators’ Impact on Whether or 
Not MFIP Participants in Ramsey County Earn Income 
76 
Null models for working participants 77 
Table 5.3. Variance Correlations for Null Models 78 
Conditional models for working participants 78 
Table 5.4. Random Effects for National Recession, Local Real GDP, and 
Ramsey County Unemployment Rate 
79 
Table 5.5. Random Effects for Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey 
County 
79 
Conditional model 1: impact of the economy on income earned 80 
Figure 5.1. Percent of Ramsey County MFIP Participants Earning Income 
Over Time 
81 
Table 5.6. ANOVA: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
82 
Table 5.7. Fixed Effects: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
83 
Table 5.8. ANOVA: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County 
Poverty Rate on Earnings 
84 
Table 5.9. Fixed Effects: Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey 
County on Earnings 
85 
Conditional model 2: impact of economy on hours worked 86 
Figure 5.2. Percent of Ramsey County MFIP Participants with Work Hours 
Over Time 
86 
Figure 5.3. Average Hours Worked Per Week 2000 - 2016 87 
Figure 5.4. Fluctuations in MFIP Participants’ Work Hours Per Week 88 
Table 5.10. ANOVA: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
90 
Table 5.11. Fixed Effects: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
90 
Table 5.12. ANOVA: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County 
Poverty Rate on Hours Worked 
92 
Table 5.13. Fixed Effects: Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey 
County on Hours Worked 
92 
Table 5.14. ANOVA: Time Effects on Hours Worked 94 
Figure 5.5. Time Effects on Hours Worked: Coefficient Change 95 
Conclusions on findings 96 
  
  
 	viii 
Chapter 6. Discussion 97 
Economic Conditions 97 
Race, Age, Education, and Gender 100 
Race 100 
Age 102 
Education 103 
Gender 103 
  
Chapter 7. Implications 106 
Policy Implications Considering Significant Economic Indicator Predictors 107 
Federal government’s response to the Great Recession: ARRA 107 
Policy changes not limited to welfare reform 109 
Policy Implications Considering Significant, Person-Level Predictors 111 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 112 
Conclusion 119 
  
References 122 
  
Appendices  
Appendix A: 135 
Testing for Assumptions of Linear Mixed Effects Models  
(Earned Income & Work Hours) 
 
Appendix B: 137 
Testing for Assumptions of Linear Mixed Effects Models  
(All Participants) 
 
Appendix C: 138 
R Code for Null Models  
Appendix D: 139 
R Code for Conditional Models   
 
 	 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1.  
Minnesota’s Welfare Reform Goals and Federal Welfare Reform Goals 
 
15 
 
Table 4.1.  
Correlations Between Local Economic Indicators 
 
 
60 
 
Table 5.1.  
Descriptive Statistics on Race, Latino Ethnicity, and Gender 
 
 
71 
 
Table 5.2.  
Local and National Economic Indicators’ Impact on Whether or Not 
MFIP Participants in Ramsey County Earn Income 
 
 
 
76 
 
Table 5.3.  
Variance Correlations for Null Models 
 
 
78 
 
Table 5.4.  
Random Effects for National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate 
 
 
 
79 
 
Table 5.5.  
Random Effects for Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey County 
 
 
79 
 
Table 5.6.  
ANOVA: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
 
 
 
82 
 
Table 5.7.  
Fixed Effects: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
 
 
 
83 
 
Table 5.8.  
ANOVA: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County Poverty 
Rate on Earnings 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table 5.9.  
Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey County on Earnings 
 
 
85 
 
Table 5.10.  
ANOVA: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 	 x 
Table 5.11.  
Fixed Effects: National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
 
 
90 
 
Table 5.12.  
ANOVA: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County Poverty 
Rate on Hours Worked 
 
 
92 
 
Table 5.13.  
Fixed Effects: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County 
Poverty Rate on Hours Worked 
 
 
 
92 
 
Table 5.14.  
ANOVA: Time Effects on Hours Worked 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
 	 xi 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  
Nesting Structure 
 
 
51 
 
Figure 4.2.  
Three Main Models 
 
 
54 
 
Figure 4.3.  
National Recessions, Local Real GDP, Ramsey County Unemployment 
Rate, and Ramsey County Poverty Rate Between 2000 and 2016 
 
 
 
57 
 
Figure 4.4.  
National Recessions, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County Median Income 
Between 2000 and 2016 
 
 
 
59 
 
Figure 5.1.  
Percent of Ramsey County MFIP Participants Earning Income Over Time 
 
 
 
81 
 
Figure 5.2.  
Percent of Ramsey County MFIP Participants with Work Hours Over Time 
 
 
 
86 
 
Figure 5.3.  
Average Hours Worked Per Week 2000 – 2016 
 
 
87 
 
Figure 5.4. 
Fluctuations in MFIP Participants’ Work Hours Per Week 
 
 
88 
 
Figure 5.5. 
Time Effects on Hours Worked: Coefficient Change 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 	 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Problem Statement 
In a country as wealthy as the United States, one might wonder how 45.3 million 
people can be living in poverty (DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014). This is an indication 
that the United States’ welfare state is largely ineffective in confronting economic 
hardship despite decades’ worth of efforts to design and implement welfare programs that 
address the needs of low-income families. Perhaps it is due to the fact that reputed anti-
poverty programs are not designed to reduce poverty as much as they intend to decrease 
dependence on government assistance by encouraging participation in the labor market 
and by strengthening families.  Through the most recent effort, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) (Public Law No. 104-193). Its stated goals are: to “provide 
assistance to needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes; reduce 
the dependency of needy parents by promoting job preparation, work and marriage; 
prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; [and] encourage the 
formation and maintenance of two-parent families” (U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, 2015).  In the immediate years following PRWORA, welfare caseloads 
and unemployment decreased, causing George W. Bush on behalf of the federal 
government to declare, “The welfare law is a success because it puts government on the 
side of personal responsibility, and it has helped people change their life for the better -- 
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helped people realize their dreams; helped people help themselves” (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 2003). 
Post-PRWORA research focuses mainly on the impact of welfare reform policies 
and programs on welfare recipients’ financial well-being. As the economy continued to 
grow in the late 1990s and early 2000s and welfare cases declined (Center on Budget 
Policies and Priorities, 2014), many welfare analysts declared PRWORA a success 
(Haskins & Greenberg, 2006). Even in the early years of TANF’s purported success, 
social welfare and policy researchers viewed such findings with skepticism. For example, 
Primus, Rawlings, Larin, & Porter (1999) point out that a reduction in welfare caseloads 
is not an indication by itself that TANF is working; rather, a robust economy creates 
more jobs for employable welfare recipients.  Researchers in areas of social justice 
challenged the claims about welfare reform’s effectiveness on the basis that decreased 
caseloads only provide a partial story and are not the only way to measure success 
(Schram & Soss, 2001; Hawkins, 2005). Despite efforts to advocate on behalf of welfare 
participants who continued to struggle (Abramovitz, 2001; Baptist & Bricker-Jenkins, 
2001; Burnham, 2001; Mink, 2001; Marchevsky & Theoharis, 2008), attention to 
PRWORA’s efficacy faded from the forefront of social work literature during the first 
decade of the new millennium. Furthermore, regardless of efforts by researchers and 
advocates for the poor, TANF has remained virtually unchanged since its inception in 
1996 (Danziger, Wiederspan, & Douglas-Siegel, 2013). Bitler and Hoynes (2016) draw 
attention to the inextricable link between “labor market opportunities, economic growth, 
and poverty” and conclude that TANF’s role as a social safety net has diminished, and 
that it did not sufficiently address the needs of those eligible for it during the Great 
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Recession (p. S404). More research is needed to provide evidence for changing welfare 
policy again such that the goals of the program are more aligned with the needs of the 
participants.  
Considering the economic upheaval during the mid-2000s and the overall increase 
in poverty since 1996 (Lamison-White, 1997; DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, 2014), welfare 
reform once again needs to be at the forefront of social policy research. Two decades and 
one Great Recession later, it is possible to more fully examine the effects of the economy 
versus the effects of TANF’s work requirements on welfare participants’ ability to find 
employment that dissuades dependence on public assistance. This dissertation will 
provide insight into welfare reform’s impact from a longitudinal perspective; twenty 
years have passed since TANF began, and now it is not only possible, but also essential, 
to consider the fluctuations in the economy over time as a factor in analyzing the impact 
of welfare reform in order to make recommendations for improving the way public 
assistance programs help those who need them.  
The problem, as defined by this dissertation, is that antipoverty programs do not 
aim to reduce poverty, and that the “opportunities” piece of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996 is lacking during slow economies. 
Given that even skilled workers have difficulty finding employment during economic 
recessions, this dissertation explores the particular challenges faced by TANF 
participants who, in order to receive cash assistance, must comply with work 
requirements. The Minnesota Family Investment Program (hereafter, MFIP) will be used 
as an example of one state’s TANF implementation to add to a body of research on 
individual states in the upper Midwest (Michigan: Danziger, Wiederspan, & Douglas-
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Siegel, 2013; Wisconsin: Kwon & Meyer, 2011). This study builds on existing research 
by providing another Midwestern state’s example of the economy’s impact on TANF 
participants.  Minnesota is of particular interest due to its reputation as generous to its 
welfare participants and because of the researcher’s location and access to data.  
In addition to the unique struggles welfare participants face in finding 
employment during economic downturns, research also shows that race plays a role in the 
challenges welfare participants encounter, particularly for African Americans (Sheely, 
2012; Kwon & Meyer, 2011). In Minnesota, over a six-and-a-half year period between 
2004 and 2010, African Americans and American Indians experienced lower rates of 
MFIP success as compared to Non-Somali Black Immigrants, Somali, Hmong, Hispanic, 
White, Non-Hmong Asians (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011). 
Therefore, this research will also examine the impact of race on welfare reform 
participants’ experiences in looking for and finding employment as the economy ebbs 
and flows. 
Research Question 
Based on welfare reform literature, most notably the speculation that the economy 
plays a crucial role in TANF participants’ opportunities to transition off cash assistance, 
this dissertation poses the following research question: to what extent do economic 
conditions (particularly during economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, 
Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education) influence MFIP participants’ employment 
opportunities in terms of earnings and work hours?   
The next chapter of this dissertation begins with a review of the literature, which 
provides historical context for welfare reform as it is known today, as well as what 
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research on TANF shows. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical context for this dissertation, 
and states the hypothesis. The research methods are described in Chapter 4, and include a 
detailed description of the population, justification for using linear mixed effects 
modeling, operational definitions of the predictor and response variables, and 
mathematical notation of the statistical models. The findings are presented in Chapter 5, 
and include both descriptive statistics and the results of the mixed effects models. 
Chapter 6 is a discussion of the findings, and this dissertation concludes with Chapter 7, 
policy implications.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This literature review examines the impact of welfare reform and the greater 
economy on participants’ success in finding and maintaining employment. To provide the 
necessary background information for this research study, this paper begins with a brief 
discussion on welfare reform’s evolution and examines what the literature shows in terms 
of welfare reform’s success. The literature is then linked to this dissertation research 
project to more fully analyze Minnesota’s implementation of TANF, the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program (MFIP), in Ramsey County. Although this study focuses on 
Minnesota, the literature review is based on research on federal welfare reform because it 
is important to understand MFIP in the broader context of TANF.  
Welfare Reform: History and Policy Context 
Of particular importance is that even at its establishment in 1935, means-tested 
public assistance was not intended as an anti-poverty program, which is perhaps a major 
reason it receives criticism from advocates on behalf of those participating in the it. 
Furthermore, even though TANF is the most current means-tested public assistance 
program, the competing values of family and work have been prominent throughout all of 
its modifications. This is especially important when considering that TANF’s main 
objectives are to promote strong families and financial independence, similar to Aid to 
Dependent Children in 1935. 
At its inception as Title IV of the 1935 Social Security Act, Aid to Dependent 
Children (ADC) was intended to provide income assistance for children whose families 
had suffered due to the loss (including death, desertion, or incapacitation) of a male 
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breadwinner, and was meant to help surviving mothers care for their children in the home 
(Public Law No. 74-271).  When the Social Security Act was amended in 1939, many 
widows became eligible for Old Age Insurance, which left ADC to support the remaining 
families, most of which were headed by single mothers (Abramovitz, 1996).  In 1950, the 
Social Security Act was amended again to extend ADC benefits to caretakers of 
dependent children, who were most often mothers (Mink & Solinger, 2003). 
In the 1950s, the ADC rolls began to change. The population was growing, people 
experienced increased mobility in terms of residence, the formal labor market was not 
meeting the economic needs of certain segments of the population, and family structures 
were changing due to increased divorce and out-of-wedlock births; therefore, the 
demographics of ADC changed as well. Increasing numbers of families became eligible 
for ADC, many of whom were African American, whose unemployment rate was double 
that of Caucasians (Mink & Solinger, 2003). What had once been a program intended for 
Caucasian, widowed mothers was now comprised of unmarried mothers and African 
Americans, and was seen as a threat to the traditional family structure by the early to 
mid-1950s (Abramovitz, 1996). In response, the Social Security Act underwent 
legislative changes in 1956 that aimed to decrease dependence on public assistance “by 
strengthening family life and facilitating self-support” (Abramovitz, 1996, p. 330). ADC 
was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by the Public Welfare 
Amendments of 1962 (Public Law No. 87-543), which gave the program a family focus 
and extended eligibility to families whose breadwinner lost income due to unemployment 
(Abramovitz, 1996). 
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, AFDC, unlike social insurance programs, was 
under constant scrutiny and subject to reform proposals that emphasized working to merit 
the receipt of cash benefits. For example, Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, 
announced in 1969, attempted unsuccessfully to introduce a work requirement to AFDC; 
however, Nixon’s efforts to attach work stipulations to public assistance were eventually 
incorporated into AFDC, as more states throughout the 1970s and 1980s began to require 
some of their cash assistance recipients to work at least part time in exchange for benefits 
(Mittelstadt, 2005), and were legally actualized when President Clinton responded to the 
calls for welfare reform in 1996 by declaring, “ ‘From now on our nation’s answer to this 
great social challenge will no longer be a never-ending cycle of welfare: it will be the 
dignity, the power, and the ethic of work’ ” (Mink & Solinger, 2003, p. 59), and by 
signing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), which changed AFDC into TANF (Public Law No. 104-193). 
Although AFDC had undergone several legislative changes by the time President 
Clinton signed PRWORA, TANF constituted a major policy overhaul at the federal level, 
the first of its kind since the Social Security Act introduced ADC in 1935. For the first 
time in public assistance history, states were given control of a federally governed 
program. What began in 1996 with PRWORA continued through the first federal block 
grant expiration in 2002 as TANF was reauthorized many times thereafter, as part of 
omnibus legislation. The main changes under TANF include mandatory work activities in 
exchange for welfare receipt, a lifetime limit to participate in the program, block grant 
funding from the federal government to states, and devolution of responsibility from 
federal to state governments.  Above all, TANF discourages welfare dependence; its 
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primary objective is to “help needy families achieve self-sufficiency” by promoting labor 
market participation, and marriage and two-parent families, rather than government aid, 
as the means to support one’s family (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
2015).  It seeks to move participants into employment as quickly as possible by 
mandating work activity, and enforces adherence to work requirements through 
sanctioning participants’ benefits for non-compliance.  TANF also established a 60-
month lifetime limit to receive federal cash assistance, and shifted federal responsibility 
to each individual state for developing welfare programs in accordance with federal 
regulations.  Through block grants, the federal government funds states’ programs, but 
TANF does not guarantee continued federal funding, and the amount allocated is fixed 
regardless of caseload size (PL 104-193).  Thus, for the first time since the federal 
government took charge of redistributing means-tested benefits to poor families, 
entitlement to welfare at the federal level was rescinded, and responsibility for those in 
poverty was diffused to the states (Zylan & Soule, 2000).  
When TANF expired in 2002, it was first reauthorized under the Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act of 2002, which provided continued federal funding through 
December 30, 2005 (Public Law No. 107-147). President George W. Bush reauthorized it 
again under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.  The reauthorization, which extended 
federal TANF funding through 2010, resulted in stricter work requirements for states, 
requiring them to have 50% (rather than 25%, as was the case in the 1996 TANF 
legislation) of their single-parent family cases in employment or job search status, and 
90% (as opposed to 75%) of their two-parent family cases in employment or job search 
status (Public Law No. 109-171).  States failing to comply with these new requirements 
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risk a loss of federal funding (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2005). The Great 
Recession began before TANF’s 2010 expiration date, and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided extra temporary funding to states to help 
offset the impact of the recession (Public Law No. 111-5). TANF was scheduled to 
undergo reauthorization again in 2010, but instead of proposing further reform, Congress 
extended federal block grant funding through September 2011 under the Claims 
Resolution Act of 2010, while the policy changes made in 2006 remained (Public Law 
No. 111-291).  Thereafter, Congress passed short-term TANF funding resolutions 
through Continuing Appropriations Acts, and aside from a brief funding lapse during the 
2013 federal government shutdown, TANF funding continued (House Ways & Means 
Committee, 2014). Rather than expanding or reforming TANF during and after the Great 
Recession, the Obama administration created different acts to address poverty and high 
unemployment, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public 
Law No. 111-5) and the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010 
(Public Law No. 111-147), neither of which specifically targeted TANF participants. 
TANF funding is currently part of continuing resolutions and needs to be renewed year 
after year (Falk, 2015), and is at risk for considerably reduced funding as part of 
President Trump’s proposed 2018 budget (Parrott & Shapiro, 2017).   
Literature on TANF Outcomes 
Shortly after PRWORA was signed in 1996, welfare reform research was 
abundant; policy analysts and social workers alike routinely studied its efficacy. Welfare 
reform research slowly faded from the literature as the years passed, much like it faded 
from being its own congressional act to being part of omnibus acts. Some welfare reform 
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research in the immediate years following PRWORA focuses mainly on TANF’s efficacy 
in terms of caseload decline (The White House, 2002), and it is interpreted with caution 
by other researchers, for the main measure of success was smaller caseloads, which could 
have happened as a result of many factors other than TANF itself (Blank, 2002). At the 
time, little attention was given to economic factors that could affect TANF’s success. 
This makes sense, given that many years need to pass for economic conditions as 
impactful time periods can be studied; however, long before researchers could test 
welfare reform’s success, some questioned the economy’s role in welfare caseload 
reduction. Prior to Clinton’s 1996 PRWORA, Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, and Connolly (2000) 
considered the factors contributing to the 1993-1996 decline in AFDC caseloads, after 
several states began implementing work-focused programs in anticipation of federal 
welfare reform.  Results indicate that the economy, rather than states’ experiments with 
welfare-to-work activities and waivers from federal policies, was largely responsible for 
the decline in the number of AFDC participants. The researchers conclude that a strong 
economy is a better indicator of declining welfare caseloads than welfare reform policies 
themselves prior to PRWORA. They also suggest that the impact of welfare reform is not 
instantaneous and that work incentive waivers may increase caseloads at first, but they 
predict that over time, welfare caseloads should decline as a result of PRWORA, except 
during economic recessions. Ziliak et al. (2000) also suggest that economic recessions 
play a role in welfare reform outcomes. Blank’s (2002) conclusion about the impact of 
TANF is quite insightful: “Most important, perhaps, is the question of how much the 
remarkable U.S. economy in the late 1990s was fueling the declines in caseloads, and 
increases in work and income among low-wage single mothers. Only as we experience 
 	 12 
economic cycles will we be able to effectively separate the economic effects from the 
policy effects of welfare reform” (p. 1159). Research such as this is evidence of the need 
to approach with wariness studies that tout TANF as a success, and the current 
dissertation research builds on Ziliak et al.’s (2000) and Blank’s (2002) conjecture now 
that twenty years of post-PRWORA economic cycles have occurred. 
 From a purely objective standpoint, welfare reform research that focuses mainly 
on the success of the program in terms of caseload reductions and participants leaving 
welfare for work is in congruence with welfare reform’s goals. However, to what extent 
did TANF programs themselves contribute to decreased caseloads? Social workers and 
other advocates for welfare reform participants doubt whether welfare reform is working 
simply because caseloads have declined; there are many other factors that influence 
fluctuations in caseload size, and some question whether a robust economy plays a larger 
role in moving people off welfare than welfare itself.  For example, Kwon and Meyer 
(2013) consider employment retention of welfare leavers in 1998 and 2001, years in 
which welfare reform was working in conjunction with a growing economy, and 
conclude that the success of welfare reform in terms of people leaving it for employment 
is difficult to parse apart from the influence of economic conditions.  Based on qualitative 
interviews done in Michigan in 2007 (prior to the Great Recession), Danziger, 
Weiderspan, & Douglas-Siegal (2013) are skeptical of how successful a work-first 
approach can be in times of economic recessions. Their study shows that the general 
consensus among participants is that there is a need for better-paying, stable jobs with 
health insurance and paid time off that could realistically and permanently remove them 
from poverty, and the vast majority of participants were dissatisfied with the services 
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they received as part of the TANF program in Michigan. Sheely (2012) critically 
examines census data and questions welfare reform’s success because child poverty 
during the 2007-2009 recession and welfare cases did not increase at the same rate (child 
poverty increased by nearly 12%, whereas caseloads increased by nearly 6%). 
Furthermore, caseload quantities varied by state, with some states experiencing slight 
increases during the recession and others experiencing decreases in this same time period. 
Sheely suggests it is time to return focus to the efficacy and advantages of state-
controlled welfare programs after they faded from the literature during the economic 
boom of the early millennium; additionally, Sheely points out that much of the research 
focuses on periods during economic growth and suggests a need for researchers to 
evaluate welfare reform’s success when the economy is worse.  
Considering that welfare reform research has been scant for several years and that 
the body of recent research that does exist is rather small, more scrutiny needs to be given 
to how well TANF has worked over time. Researchers call for a TANF policy shift; new 
policies should focus on reducing poverty instead of just caseloads, and the federal 
government should provide more financial assistance to states through the TANF 
Contingency Fund, particularly during times of economic downturns (Sheely, 2012). 
Danziger, Wiederspan, and Douglas-Siegal (2013) recommend that program participants 
should be given a chance to voice individual concerns and have services tailored to their 
specific needs because the work-first approach is not effective for people with multiple 
and diverse barriers, particularly during economic recessions; they suggest that TANF’s 
unyielding endorsement of labor market participation hinders states’ attempts to provide 
appropriate resources to families in need. Minnesota is noteworthy from this perspective 
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because MFIP’s stated goals include moving participants “out of poverty” (Minnesota 
Department of Human Services, 2017). Owing to the fact that policy change occurs 
slowly, in order to accomplish any change, be it modifications or an overhaul, more 
research is needed to show the impact of the greater economy on TANF’s ability to 
address the needs of its participants. Given that states are in control of their own public 
assistance programs, such research needs to be done at the state level, both to improve 
TANF programs specific to a particular state, and to provide opportunities for 
policymakers to learn from what works and does not such that they may apply it to their 
own states. 
Conclusions and Contribution to Existing Research 
The literature on welfare reform, past and present, shows that competing values of 
family and work have been an integral part of means-tested public assistance programs 
ever since they began. Although policies have expanded to make more low-income 
families eligible for aid, their crucial guiding force is to move families into self-
sufficiency through work and family stabilization, and ultimately away from depending 
on government assistance. 
Now that two decades have passed since PRWORA, during which the United 
States experienced the Great Recession of 2007-2009, what can we learn by looking at 
welfare participation during periods of economic booms and during recessions? The 
economy has been growing and shrinking in smaller waves since welfare reform’s 
inception in 1996, but the Great Recession was the first major economic downturn.  
The research that does exist on post-recession welfare reform shows that social 
workers and some politicians are highly skeptical of TANF’s ability to move people out 
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of poverty, which is not surprising, since that is not one of its stated goals. The general 
consensus among researchers is that welfare reform needs to be reformed. This is not 
likely to happen without more evidence to support TANF’s widespread failure to 
adequately support low-income families. As a result of devolution, there is much 
variation among states in how TANF is implemented. For example, Minnesota’s goals 
address poverty, whereas federal goals do not (see Table 2.1).   
Table 2.1. Minnesota’s Welfare Reform Goals and Federal Welfare Reform Goals 
Minnesota: MFIP’s Goals Federal: TANF’s Goals 
“To encourage and enable all families to find 
employment.” 
“Provide assistance to needy families so that 
children can be cared for in their own homes.” 
“To help families increase their income and move 
out of poverty.” 
“Reduce the dependency of needy parents by 
promoting job preparation, work and marriage.” 
“To prevent long-term dependence on welfare as a 
primary source of family income.” 
“Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-
wedlock pregnancies.” 
 “Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-
parent families.” 
Sources:  
Minnesota Department of Human Services (2017); U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (2015) 
 
There is a great need for research from many states to show how TANF could be 
improved for participants in ways specific to each state. 
This dissertation will provide an example of Minnesota’s efforts to provide cash, 
food and employment assistance to low-income families during both strong and weak 
economies. It will examine the extent to which economic conditions impact MFIP 
participants’ employment opportunities in terms of income and work hours so that they 
may support their families. Additionally, it will consider the many factors that contribute 
to MFIP participants’ opportunities to leave public assistance for paid employment. Not 
all MFIP participants have an equal chance to succeed in the program. For example, both 
Hollister, Martin, Toft, Yeo, & Kim (2003) and McDonnell (2004) agree that MFIP 
appears to better serve those who are higher educated and have more job skills.  Racial 
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disparities appear to be notable in MFIP. Hollister et al. (2003) report that the wage-
earned income of Caucasians is much higher than that of any other ethnicity or race, a 
difference that was statistically significant. Additionally, “[m]inority MFIP recipients 
also described rude and demeaning treatment and asserted that job counselors withheld 
information and resources that could help them” (McDonnell, 2004, p. 4). There are also 
reports from nonwhite MFIP recipients of “bias and lack of understanding of their 
challenges and cultural values among job counselors” (McDonnell, 2004, p. 12). Since 
paid employment is the focus of welfare reform, and employment counselors are 
responsible for carrying out services that promote work activity, it is reasonable to 
assume that if minorities, who make up more than half of Minnesota's welfare caseload 
(DeMaster & Crichton, 2006), are experiencing any discrimination from their 
employment counselors, MFIP does them a disservice at a very fundamental level. 
Furthermore, Caucasian adults are far less likely to participate in MFIP than any other 
racial group, and according to the disparity index in Minnesota in 2007, which measures 
the probability of minority groups’ participation in MFIP compared to that of Caucasians, 
African American or African-born immigrants are “eighteen times more likely” to be 
MFIP participants and American Indians are “twenty-two times more likely” (DeMaster, 
2009, p. 12). Finally, in light of the latest Census data that still show racial disparities in 
earnings in Minnesota, this study will consider racial inequality in MFIP outcomes, 
particularly for African Americans, whose median income is about half that of 
Caucasians and Asian Americans (Collins & Xaykaothao, 2015). 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Context and Hypothesis 
This chapter examines social welfare policy and economic theory as it pertains to 
this dissertation. It begins by presenting a definition of social welfare policy in the 
context of welfare reform. This definition is then linked to the theory behind economists’ 
definition of a recession, and based on these theories, this dissertation’s main research 
question is re-stated and the hypothesis is presented. 
To help understand the impact of the economy on TANF/MFIP participants’ 
employment outcomes, it is important to consider that policy scholarship is inundated 
with definitions of social welfare policy. These definitions range from relatively simple 
descriptive statements about welfare provision to those in need (Chatterjee, 1996; Gilbert 
& Terrell, 2005) to critical examinations of such provision in maintaining social order 
(Abramovitz, 2000; Piven & Cloward, 1971). Although the various definitions of social 
welfare policy each contribute to the understanding of welfare reform, the utility of each 
depends on the lens through which one is using to examine policy. For the purposes of 
this paper, Chatterjee’s (1996) definition is the most relevant to understanding TANF 
from a longitudinal perspective because it encompasses the nature of the political and 
economic structures of the United States. According to Chatterjee (1996), social welfare 
policy is the culmination of strategies to transfer goods and services from a unit of 
organization (such as a government or private charity) to those who face challenges in 
meeting basic needs.  Chatterjee also contends that social welfare policy is comprised of 
ideologies that often conflict (such as capitalism and socialism) in terms of the role of 
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government, and that social welfare policy is inextricably linked with economic policy 
because it utilizes income redistribution as a means to address basic needs.   
Chatterjee approaches social welfare policy by providing a general definition and 
by acknowledging conflicting ideologies that are a part of policy development. Chatterjee 
focuses on people whose basic needs are jeopardized because of economic insecurity, and 
connects social and economic policy, which is essential for understanding policy in the 
United States because of the government’s reliance on income redistribution for social 
welfare provision. Chatterjee’s (1996) definition allows for the understanding of the 
many complexities that comprise social welfare policy, particularly that which is intended 
for those who grapple with economic challenges. TANF fits particularly well with 
Chatterjee’s (1996) definition because its units of organization range from federal and 
state governments to county-based and non-profit organizations that carry out its 
programs. It is a means-tested program designed to help those who struggle to meet their 
basic needs. It is the source of many debates concerning the government’s role (at the 
state and federal levels) in means-tested benefit provision. Finally, TANF is the product 
of a dominant ideology that promotes the work ethic and family stability (defined as two-
parent families) in the United States (Blank & Haskins, 2001; Mead, 1997), and is a 
compromise between social welfare expenditure to redistribute income (by encouraging 
and rewarding work) and an economy with little government intervention.  
This research is informed by Chatterjee’s (1996) definition of social welfare 
policy and economic theory as it relates to social work, specifically in terms of how 
economic theory helps inform social welfare policies, which aim to redistribute societal 
resources among those in need. Economic theory at its most basic level is concerned with 
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the distribution of goods and services to society members as a means to address the 
“economic problem” of how to divide limited resources amid conflicting perspectives 
regarding who receives what, and from whom (Lewis & Widerquist, 2001, p. 5). 
Societies establish economies, or social systems, to address the aforementioned economic 
problem. Societies also establish governments, one role of which is to counterbalance 
market failures and redistribute goods and services to those in society who struggle most, 
regardless of market conditions. 
 This research focuses on the government’s role in addressing the economic 
problem because it centers around a government-subsidized program, TANF at the 
federal level, and MFIP at the state level. TANF (and its state-run implementations) is an 
example of government intervention to offset market failures which affect a subset of the 
population whose income is low enough even in robust economies to render them eligible 
for public assistance. It is informed by the relationship between microeconomics and 
macroeconomics in that it addresses how macroeconomic conditions (recessions and their 
indicators) have a microeconomic impact on MFIP participants.  
This research uses the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER’s) 
definition of an economic recession: “a significant decline in economic activity spread 
across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real 
income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales” (NBER, n.d.a).  
Recessions occur as a result of decreased GDP and income, and may trigger increased 
unemployment rates and increased poverty rates; all of these factors influence people to 
greater and lesser degrees, regardless of income, but are perhaps especially hard on low-
income families.  
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This dissertation explores the impact of recessions on members of society, 
specifically MFIP participants, who struggle financially both in recessions and robust 
economies, and poses the following main research question: to what extent do economic 
conditions (particularly during economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, 
Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education) influence Ramsey County MFIP 
participants’ employment opportunities in terms of earnings and work hours? This 
dissertation hypothesizes that economic conditions, particularly those of local economic 
sectors, have a significant impact on MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours. The 
next chapter details the methods used to explore the research question and to test the 
hypothesis. 
 
 	 21 
Chapter 4 
Methods 
 Previous literature calls for more research on economic conditions and their 
impact on welfare reform participants, and this dissertation aims to answer such calls. 
Although it is beyond the scope of any research to provide definitive findings that apply 
to all situations, this dissertation contributes more knowledge in this area by looking at 
Minnesota’s implementation of TANF and how Ramsey County participants are 
impacted by the condition of the national and local economy. This chapter centers around 
the methods used to address the research question: to what extent do economic conditions 
(particularly during economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, Latino 
ethnicity, gender, age, and education) influence Ramsey County MFIP participants’ 
employment opportunities in terms of earnings and work hours? This research question 
tests the hypothesis that economic conditions have a significant impact on employment 
opportunities for Ramsey County MFIP participants. This chapter first presents the main 
research question divided into three parts, provides a brief description of the variables, 
and then continues with a description of the design, data, and the population, and then 
illustrates the steps taken from pre-analysis to fitting the linear mixed effects models to 
the dataset.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 Although this research centers around one main question, it is divided into three 
parts to test one hypothesis: economic conditions have a significant impact on Ramsey 
County MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours. There are three parts to the research 
questions because there are three dependent (response variables): 1) whether or not 
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Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income; 2) Ramsey County MFIP participants’ 
monthly earnings; and 3) Ramsey County MFIP participants’ monthly work hours. 
Research Question 1: To what extent does the condition of the economy predict whether 
or not Ramsey County MFIP earn income? 
Research Question 2: To what extent does the condition of the economy influence 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in terms of earnings? 
Research Question 3: To what extent does the condition of the economy influence 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in terms of hours worked? 
Additionally, Research Question 3 has a sub question: To what extent does time, 
particularly during the years in which the United States experienced two economic 
recessions, influence Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in 
terms of work hours? 
For all three research questions, the following independent (predictor) variables 
are used: the condition of the national and local economy, as measured by a dummy 
coded variable indicating whether or not the United States is in a recession, the local real 
GDP for the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, Ramsey 
County unemployment rate, Ramsey County median income, and Ramsey County 
poverty rate. The sub question for Research Question 3 uses dummy coded year variables 
in place of all economic indicator predictor variables. 
Design 
This is a quasi experimental, longitudinal panel study. Participants are not 
randomly assigned to control and experimental groups. It covers a total of 17 years, 
starting with January 2000 (four years after PRWORA was signed into law, when TANF 
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replaced AFDC) and ending with December 2016. Although data exist into 2017, the data 
for this study were extracted in May 2017, and only included “frozen” data for January 
and February 2017; furthermore, data on economic indicators (poverty rate, median 
income, and real GDP) are collected annually and were not available for 2017 at the time 
of data analysis. This study uses a panel design because all participants’ data occur in 
multiple time points, and linear mixed effects models were used for analysis because data 
are comprised of multiple observations over time (204 months), but the number of 
observations per participant vary, as do the months over which each observation occurs.  
Data: Secondary Data Analysis and Human Subjects Considerations 
Data for the economic conditions predictor variables come from multiple sources. 
A dummy coded variable indicating whether the United States is in a recession for each 
month of this study was created by the researcher based on the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s (hereafter, NBER) (n.d.a) declaration of whether or not the United 
States was in a national recession. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) was 
used for real GDP in the Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI metropolitan area 
(n.d.). The metropolitan GDP variable includes all industry totals, and are in chained 
2009 dollars. Real GDP for the Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI metropolitan 
area is the most local dataset available; the BEA currently has a research agenda to 
collect real GDP data at the county level, but at the time of this research, had not begun to 
do so (furthermore, this research dates back to 2000, and county-level real GDP does not 
exist yet) (Guci, Mead, & Panek, 2016). The BEA recommends using chained dollar 
estimates for making comparisons across time, as in doing longitudinal research. The 
U.S. Census Bureau (2017) was used for Ramsey County’s median income. To be 
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consistent with previous research, the Ramsey County monthly unemployment rate was 
used in conjunction with the first four predictor variables (Minnesota Department of 
Employment and Economic Development, 2017). The poverty rate for Ramsey County 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2017), was also used as a predictor variable because this study 
involves a low-income population, and national, state, and local metropolitan recession 
indicators, as well as the unemployment rate, may not adequately reflect economic 
experiences for this population. It is important to note that NBER does not characterize 
poverty rate as a factor that impacts economic activity; however, it is a lagging indicator 
of economic declines. How economic conditions are defined and measured is described 
in the section on variables.  
Secondary data, collected by Ramsey County Community Human services, were 
used for the response variables and the control variables. A Senior Program Evaluator 
from Ramsey County Community Human Services provided de-identified MFIP data 
from the MAXIS data system for all of the dependent and person-level predictor (control) 
variables. The Senior Program Evaluator used Access to randomly generate ID numbers 
specific to this project to remove the MAXIS ID, which is linked to participants’ Social 
Security Numbers; the researcher asked that new IDs be generated so there would be no 
possibility of identifying any of the participants, and the researcher had no contact with 
any participant. This research qualified for an expedited review by the University of 
Minnesota IRB, and was found exempt from the full review. The researcher complied 
with the Ramsey County MFIP data sharing protocol. 
MAXIS is the name of the database used to establish eligibility and distribute 
benefits to participants in MFIP and other public assistance programs; the letters do not 
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stand for anything (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2016b). MAXIS consists 
of all data pertaining to MFIP participants, and includes all of the months in which a 
participant is active on MFIP, even when there are no reported work hours or earned 
income. 
All MFIP data collected are used to determine eligibility and benefit amounts. 
MFIP data are entered into MAXIS, the database for MFIP eligibility, by Ramsey County 
Financial Workers and are based on MFIP participants’ self-reports during the 
application process and every month for the duration they participate in the program. 
Hours worked and wages are reported on the Household Report Form (HRF), and 
submitted to Financial Workers monthly. The HRF is required in order for participants to 
remain eligible for MFIP benefits, all earned income must be reported, and Financial 
Workers enter the HRF data into MAXIS (M. Herzfeld, personal communication, Dec. 3, 
2016). Demographic data are collected as part of the application process. 
The researcher was given all data from January 2000 through December 2016. No 
sample was drawn because all of the data are available; for greater statistical power, 
population data were used. Results show the true results for the population, rather than 
inferences about the population based on a sample.  
Population  
MFIP-eligible adults. Data extracted by the Senior Program Evaluator for 
Ramsey County Community Human Services include all participants who meet the 
following criteria: all MFIP-eligible adults who have participated in MFIP in Ramsey 
County for at least one month, and who are required to participate in Employment 
Services (even though at some points they may be exempt from participating in 
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Employment Services). MFIP-eligible refers to adults who meet income eligibility 
requirements for cash, food and childcare assistance. Some participants in the population 
will be receiving food and childcare assistance, but no cash. Ramsey County keeps cases 
open for participants whose incomes hover around eligibility to avoid having participants 
go through the application process multiple times (M. Herzfeld, personal communication, 
May 12, 2017). Financial Workers assist participants with deciding whether or not to opt 
out of MFIP for a particular month when their cash grant would be low so they do not use 
months against their 60-month clock; any amount of cash counts against the clock, even 
$1.00, and it does not behoove participants to collect cash during the months when their 
income reduces their cash grant to a great extent; however, they are still MFIP-eligible 
because their income meets the eligibility requirement for the food portion and child care 
assistance. In addition to the cases who are kept MFIP-eligible when the household 
income hovers around the eligibility line, there are also cases that get suspended. This 
happens in months when there are three paydays (on a bi-weekly paycheck schedule), and 
the extra paycheck puts participants over income for that month; rather than closing the 
case when it is clear the income increase is temporary and due to a paycheck schedule, 
Ramsey County suspends it, and then it is automatically unsuspended the following 
month when there are just two paychecks again (D. DeMaster, personal communication, 
May 31, 2017). 
The federal work participation rate is the guiding force behind states’ 
implementations of TANF employment services.  There are few exemptions to 
employment services participation, yet many MFIP participants face multiple obstacles in 
their attempts to remain in compliance with work requirements. Due to the expectation 
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that states meet the federal work participation rate, and because work (and/or work 
activity) is a condition of TANF/MFIP receipt, the population for this study is 
specifically defined as: active MFIP-eligible adults (parents) in Ramsey County who are 
required to participate in Employment Services between January 2000 and December 
2016, regardless of whether or not they were exempt at any point, and regardless of 
whether their cash assistance funding source is federal or state and does or does not count 
against their 60-month lifetime limit. The participants in this study include those who 
have been active on MFIP for at least three months. It does not include those who 
received MFIP for less than three months in Ramsey County because it often takes three 
months to establish participants in WorkForce One (WF1) and Employment Services. 
Because this research specifically addresses employment, a three-month minimum was 
recommended (A. Wanless, personal communication, June 8, 2017). Furthermore, 
although it takes three months for participants to become enrolled in Employment 
Services, the three month-minimum does not refer to three consecutive months because 
the data should reflect the true population as close as possible. Since this research 
considers the cyclical nature of MFIP, participants who received MFIP for at least three 
non-consecutive months need to be included to accurately represent recurring episodes of 
MFIP participation.  
The participant population for this study is at the individual level, rather than at 
the case level. In MFIP, each individual is required to participate in Employment 
Services (unless s/he is temporarily exempt). Even in two-parent families, each parent is 
expected to contribute to the work participation rate. Although two-parent families are 
given one cash grant, it is based on the income earned by each parent, and each parent 
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submits an individual HRF reporting her/his own income and hours worked; both 
parents’ HRFs are used to calculate the cash portion, which is then issued to the head of 
the household (D. DeMaster, personal communication, August 14, 2017). Two-parent 
families in which one parent is ineligible would not be reflected as two-parent families by 
this data because the data only include MFIP-eligible adults. There are instances in which 
a family has two parents, but one parent is ineligible for MFIP for various reasons like 
being a recipient of other unearned income (i.e. disability), being a non-citizen, having a 
fraud conviction, or having used up all 60 months of the lifetime limit (M. Herzfeld, 
personal communication, May 24, 2017).  Families with one eligible parent and one 
ineligible parent are technically two-parent families, but they are not represented as such 
in this dataset. All two-parent families in this study include parents who are both required 
to participate in Employment Services. 
There are three main groups of MFIP participants whose Employment Services 
participation data may look different from the rest of the MFIP population: teen parents 
who are still in high school (under age 18), Family Stabilization Services participants, 
and MFIP participants whose cash portion is paid with state, rather than federal, funds. 
Their circumstances and justifications for including them in the population are discussed 
next. 
Teen parents who are still in high school and are under age 18. Although the 
focus of this study is adults who are active in MFIP, teenage parents, even those under 
age 18, are grouped with active MFIP-eligible adults for data reporting purposes because 
they are required to participate in Employment Services. MFIP participants who are 
under age 18 and still in high school are required to participate in a modified form of 
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Employment Services focused on finishing high school. Their Employment Services are 
provided by public health nurses within Workforce Solutions, and although the main 
emphasis is on completing a high school degree, some do report work hours and income. 
Once they turn 18, they have the option to continue with the public health nurse and 
remain in high school if they do not have a high school diploma yet, or they can go to 
Employment Services. They are required to do one or the other for the receipt of MFIP. 
Any participant under age 20 without a HS diploma or GED can receive MFIP cash 
without losing months against the federal 60-month clock while in high school or 
pursuing a GED (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2017a).  
Family Stabilization Services participants. In the early half of this study’s 
timeline, specifically prior to February 2008, active MFIP-eligible adult parents who 
were experiencing many barriers to employment were held to the same work activity 
expectations as those whose barriers were more limited or easier to address. In February 
2008, Minnesota began a program called Family Stabilization Services (FSS) to assist the 
hardest-to-serve MFIP participants (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2016a). 
Those who qualified for FSS were still required to participate in Employment Services, 
but their employment plans and other activities vary considerably from Employment 
Services activities of MFIP participants who are not in FSS. FSS participants’ MFIP cash 
portion is state-funded, so they are not counted in the federal work participation rate 
requirements. This allows Minnesota to continue tailoring services specific to a high 
needs population without risking the loss of federal block grant funding for not being in 
compliance with the federal work participation rate (A. Wanless, personal 
communication, May 30, 2017). 
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FSS participants are included in the population because FSS did not begin until 
February 2008, this study goes back to 2000, and the data need to be comparable across 
all years. Excluding FSS participants could significantly bias the results due to their 
potentially lower employment rates. Without them, data may show participants leaving 
MFIP faster or having more success in employment activities. If FSS participants are 
excluded from this study, a sudden decrease in the number of individuals participating in 
MFIP may appear in 2008. Since 2008 was right in the middle of the Great Recession, it 
is essential for analyses to include FSS participants so that there does not appear to be a 
decrease in caseload size.  
MFIP participants whose cash portion is paid with state, rather than federal, 
funds. Although MFIP is the Minnesota’s state-run version of TANF, some participants 
are funded by the state, not the federal government. States are allowed to use their own 
funds to provide MFIP to participants. Nationwide, it is common for states to fund two-
parent families (if they allow two-parent families to participate in TANF at all) because 
the federal government expects them to have higher work participation. When two-parent 
families are on the cash portion of MFIP, both parents are required to participate in 
Employment Services, unless they meet criteria for an exemption. (D. DeMaster, 
personal communication, May 31, 2017). This study includes two-parent families in 
which both parents are required to participate in Employment Services. 
MFIP-eligible, food-portion-only participants. There are many cases in which 
participants’ income renders them ineligible for the cash portion of MFIP, but they are 
still eligible for food and child care assistance. Incomes in this population tend to hover 
around the income eligibility criterion, and those who are just receiving food and/or 
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childcare assistance are still considered MFIP-eligible and still required comply with 
work requirements and report their income to their Financial Workers, so they will also 
be included in this population. Their cases are kept open to avoid the closing and re-
opening that tends to happen when people’s incomes are on the border of eligibility. To 
further clarify, MFIP food-only cases are included, but not SNAP-only cases because the 
latter either voluntarily opt out of MFIP or their incomes are too high to make them 
MFIP-eligible. 
MFIP participants exempt from Employment Services. MFIP allows 
participants to be temporarily exempt from Employment Services for reasons such as 
being pregnant, having a child under age one in the house, being temporarily 
incapacitated, caring for an ill or incapacitated relative, being a new immigrant, having a 
Family Violence Waiver, are in the midst of a personal or family crisis, or for some other 
exemption reason that may eventually change so that they are no longer exempt 
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2017). Although participants may opt out of 
Employment Services for the duration of an exemption, many do continue to work. 
Therefore, all participants are included in the analyses regardless of their exempt status.  
Some exemptions are due to conditions that render a participant unemployable for 
an indefinite amount of time, but MFIP does not divide exemptions into permanent 
versus temporary categories because many of these exemption conditions can change for 
participants such that they become employable and can participate in Employment 
Services. Although some of the exemption statuses count against the clock despite not 
ever changing, as in having an IQ below 80, there are also extension reasons to justify 
keeping participants on MFIP beyond the 60 months (however, states cannot have more 
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than 20% of their cases on an extension). Participants who fall into these exemption 
categories are still included in the analyses because some do opt to work in spite of an 
exemption and/or long term condition that could hinder work opportunities. 
Exclusions from the population. Participants who were new to MFIP in 
November 2016 or December 2016 are excluded from the population because not enough 
time elapsed for them to meet the three-month minimum inclusion criterion. Aside from 
those, no participants are completely excluded except children and adults who are not 
eligible (as in an ineligible adult in a two-parent family). This section describes those 
who do not meet the inclusion criteria and why. 
Child-only MFIP cases do not meet the study’s inclusion criteria simply because 
there is no adult who is MFIP-eligible in a child-only case. Child-only cases occur when 
the adult in the family is not eligible for MFIP for a variety of reasons, such as not being 
a United States citizen or receiving other unearned income such as Social Security. Child-
only cases could be headed by an adult who has a disability and gets disability income 
through Social Security, but the total income meets the MFIP eligibility requirements. 
Adults in child-only cases are not required to participate in Employment Services. (D. 
DeMaster, personal communication, May 31, 2017). 
Diversionary Work Program (DWP) participants also do not meet this study’s 
inclusion criteria. DWP began in 2004 to divert families in crisis situations from having 
to apply for MFIP by addressing the crisis and transitioning adult care-givers into 
unsubsidized employment as quickly as possible. Families are allowed to participate in 
DWP for up to four months before having to apply for MFIP (Minnesota Department of 
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Human Services, 2016a). In this study, former DWP participants who eventually apply 
for MFIP are included, but are not identified as having participated in DWP. 
Pre-Analysis 
Data cleaning. The original extracted data include all adult, MFIP-eligible, and 
active on MFIP for at least one month in Ramsey County at any point between January 
2000 and December 2016. The dataset also includes months in which MFIP was received 
in other counties (as long as the active on MFIP for at least one month in Ramsey County 
criterion was met). For those participants, the data show their MFIP months outside of 
Ramsey County in addition to the month(s) in Ramsey County. The original dataset 
includes all such persons so the researcher may show an estimate of the percentage of 
MFIP participants in Ramsey County who also participate in MFIP in other counties.  
 After a discussion with a researcher from Ramsey County who works with 
Workforce One data, it was decided to exclude participants who did not participate in 
MFIP in Ramsey County for at least three months, because that is approximately how 
long it takes to get them established in Employment Services (A. Wanless, personal 
communication, June 8, 2017). The first step of data cleaning was eliminating those who 
did not receive MFIP in Ramsey County for at least three months. The three months need 
not be consecutive; although those whose months are not consecutive will not necessarily 
be enrolled in Employment Services, their data are still important because they do 
represent a subset of the population who uses MFIP for very short durations and should 
be included since they are part of Ramsey County MFIP participants. Approximately 
7.9% of the participants in the original data were removed due to having only received 
MFIP for one or two months in Ramsey County. 
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The second step in the data cleaning process was to identify the percentage of 
MFIP participants who participated in Ramsey County only, and those who moved from 
other counties to Ramsey County, and/or who moved from Ramsey County to other 
counties, and/or who moved in and out of Ramsey County during their months of MFIP 
participation. Data cleaning revealed that of those who received MFIP for at least three 
months in Ramsey County, approximately 37.8% of participants received it in Ramsey 
County and other counties, which is indicative of the high mobility of this population. 
Data cleaning also showed that 80.5% of the participants who received MFIP in Ramsey 
County for at least three months and in other counties spent the majority (greater than 
50%) of their total months on MFIP in Ramsey County. 
Due to the facts that the majority of MFIP participants in Ramsey County tend to 
stay in Ramsey County, and that this study focuses specifically on Ramsey County, the 
months in which MFIP is received in other counties are not included in the analyses. If 
someone received MFIP in other counties in addition to Ramsey County, her/his data 
only include the months spent in Ramsey County for two main reasons. First, this study 
focuses on Employment Services, which is administered at the county level. Each county 
in Minnesota has a different database to track Employment Services, and it is beyond the 
scope of this study to connect 87 different county databases. Second, if data from other 
counties were considered, they would not accurately represent Ramsey County. Although 
all of the participants in this study spent some time in Ramsey County, 19.5% spent the 
majority of their MFIP months in counties other than Ramsey. Data on such a mobile 
population can only reflect snapshots of MFIP participants’ time in Ramsey County. 
Research is limited to the data that exist, which can only be collected while participants 
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are temporarily part of the system and required to report job search hours, work hours, 
and income for eligibility purposes. Therefore, data were cleaned to only include MFIP 
participants while they received MFIP services from Ramsey County, for an n of 53,007 
individual MFIP participants who participated in MFIP in Ramsey County for at least 
three months between January 2000 and December 2016. Statistical analyses are limited 
to those earning income and reporting work hours, so the final ns for the analyses are 
smaller, but all 53,007 participants are included in the descriptive statistics to provide a 
clearer picture of the MFIP population in Ramsey County.  
 Outliers and errors. Once data had been cleaned to only include MFIP 
participants who were active on MFIP for at least three months, simple descriptive tests 
were run to gain a sense of population demographics. During this process, errors were 
discovered. 
 Age. Of the 53,007 participants, 146 (approximately 0.03%) were between ages 0 
and 15. Since this dataset includes only adults, the researcher consulted with the Senior 
Program Evaluator in Ramsey County. Although there may be some rare instances of 14- 
or 15-year-old parents, the youngest parent should be age 16, and it was recommended 
that all ages from 0 to 15 be re-coded as missing (M. Herzfeld, personal communication, 
August 2, 2017). 
 Age of youngest child. Descriptive statistics showed some errors in the age of the 
youngest child. Due to birthdate entry errors and missing birthdates for approximately 
2% of the data, some participants’ youngest children ages are missing, and some 
appeared to be over age 18. All of these values were changed to missing because once a 
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child turns 18, her/his parents are no longer eligible for MFIP. It is likely that there are 
more families with young children than this dataset shows.   
Monthly earnings and work hours. Descriptive statistics revealed errors in 
monthly earnings and work hours. Some participants had monthly earnings much higher 
than expected, given the income eligibility requirements to participate in MFIP. For 
example, one participant’s income for March 2009 was reported as $64,999.57. Upon 
further investigation, the researcher found 3,524 months with reported incomes of $3000 
or higher (approximately 0.3% of the total months). The researcher spoke with the 
Supervisor of the Office of Research and Evaluation at Ramsey County for guidance on 
how to handle such outliers in the data. 
The Office of Research and Evaluation Supervisor explained why such outliers 
are present in the data. Worker errors (entering the earned income incorrectly) account 
for much of these, and because of federal audits, the data cannot be corrected once it is 
frozen so that it is consistent with what Ramsey County reports to the federal 
government. Although these errors are corrected for calculating the cash grant, they are 
not corrected in the source system, which is the database that provided the data for this 
study. It was not possible to correct the outliers with the actual earned income; however, 
to address these outliers, the Office of Research and Evaluation Supervisor recommended 
to first check whether or not the participant was active on MFIP immediately following a 
large income month, and if so, assume the high income was not a mistake. Due to 
retrospective income reporting and a two-month lag in cash grant determination, the cash 
grant would not reflect that same month’s high income. It is possible someone 
legitimately earned what seems like a high income for this population, and then s/he 
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would exit the program in the following month, in which case those months would not be 
errors and should be kept in the data for this study. The Office of Research and 
Evaluation Supervisor provided options for how to handle potentially inaccurate data. 
One possibility was to delete the outlying cases entirely; another was to right censor the 
data by cutting the income off at a certain level, at which point the income would be 
assumed a mistake. (D. DeMaster, personal communication, July 7, 2017.) 
For those whose large income months do not result in MFIP exit, the Office of 
Research and Evaluation Supervisor recommended that the researcher use the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services Combined Manual (which includes MFIP and other 
services provided by DHS) to find the highest family wage level that would allow a 
participant to remain active on MFIP, and assume that if the income entered was higher 
than that, it would be an error. According to the Combined Manual, a family of 10 may 
receive up to $2517 per month to be eligible for MFIP (Minnesota Department of Human 
Services, 2016, October). Income eligibility is based on family size; however, most MFIP 
families are not large; in 2010, the average family was three, with one adult and two 
children (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2010), and the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services has continued to use this family composition as an 
example and guideline for brochures and fact sheets (Minnesota Department of Human 
Services, 2017b; Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2017c).  
To assess the scope of the outliers (in terms of income reporting errors in the 
dataset) and their potential impact on data analysis, the researcher began by identifying 
report months (variable name: ReportMonth) in which income over $2517 was entered. 
The 53,007 participants in this study have a total of 1,338,355 ReportMonths (each 
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participant has between three and 204 ReportMonths, or observations). Of the 1,338,355 
ReportMonths, 9,960 (less than 1%) had incomes of greater than $2517. Of the 53,007 
participants included in the dataset, there were 5,044 with at least one ReportMonth of 
greater than $2517 (9.5%). Of those, 60 participants had incomes of $6000 or greater, and 
of those, 36 participants’ incomes were deemed to be an error. Although there were likely 
to be a few errors in income reported between $2517.01 and $5999.99, it was not 
practical to look at 4,984 individual participants and assess for errors when the dataset is 
large enough to handle errors in reporting. The incomes that appeared beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be in error were changed to missing in the dataset, for a total of 63 
ReportMonths affecting 39 participants. However, this does not impact the overall n for 
the study because only the months with errors in reported income were changed to 
missing; each individual participant who had errors in reported income had one or two 
months of errors, and since the errors were changed to missing values, no participant was 
deleted entirely due to missing income values. 
Finally, a few values reflecting income and hours were changed to eliminate as 
much missing data as possible, although with such a large dataset, it is unlikely to impact 
the results. For example, one participant reported 160 hours for three months in a row, 
and an income of $2052.80 for the first and third months, but $6090.90 was entered for 
the second month; rather than replacing this with a missing value, academic judgment 
was used and the income was changed to $2052.80. Someone else reported working 160 
hours and earning $1640/month for five months, and working 160 hours but earning 
$7640 for one month. This particular month was changed to $1640 for the income earned. 
Eleven participants had months of suspected income errors, but there was not enough 
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evidence to support changing the income to a missing value. Errors in hours worked were 
also discovered during the data cleaning process; some participants had reported more 
monthly hours than there are hours in a month. Because there are approximately 730 
hours in a month, reports of 600 or more hours worked in a month were re-coded as 
missing; however, this only impacted 19 of the 53,007 participants. Although these few 
outliers in such a large dataset are unlikely to affect the overall results of the study, the 
researcher strove to have the cleanest possible data, and therefore adjusted them.  
Operational definitions of variables.  
Predictor (independent) variables. The predictor (independent) variable in this 
study is economic conditions, more specifically, the condition of the local economy, 
particularly Ramsey County.  Due to the complexity in defining economic conditions in a 
measurable way, this research uses the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) 
definition of an economic recession as a guideline for the independent variable. Many 
researchers who consider the economy’s role in TANF’s success use the unemployment 
rate as the main economic indicator (for example, Ziliak et al., 2000; Kwon & Meyer, 
2011; Pilkauskas, Currie, & Garfinkel, 2012). However, the unemployment rate alone is 
insufficient to define an economic recession for this study. First, NBER contends that it is 
a “lagging indicator,” a result of a recession, and there is considerable variation in the 
length of time it correlates directly with an economic recession (NBER, n.d.b). Second, 
the unemployment rate for those participating in MFIP would likely be higher than the 
unemployment rate in the general population because many people who apply for MFIP 
are unemployed or underemployed. To be consistent with previous research, county-level 
monthly unemployment data (RamseyCountyUnempl_Rt) are used for this study in 
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conjunction with other economic indicators that are consistent with NBER’s definition of 
a recession: a dummy coded independent variable Recession_or_Not to represent 
national-level recessions, and annual real GDP in 2009 chained dollars for metropolitan 
area Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI (RealGDP_Metro) to represent 
economic conditions at the state and local levels. Annual median income 
(MedianIncome_RamseyCo) is also used to provide another more locally nuanced 
economic indicator. Furthermore, because MFIP is designed to address the needs of 
families with low incomes, and one of its goals is to move families out of poverty, and 
poverty data for Ramsey County (PovertyRate_RamseyCo) is used as an additional 
economic indicator. All economic indicators except Recession_or_Not were obtained 
using web-based interactive data mapping tools (Minnesota Department of Employment 
and Economic Development, 2017; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, (n.d.); U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2017). Recession_or_Not was determined manually by the researcher by 
looking at NBER’s business cycles, and the months during which a recession began and 
ended (National Bureau of Economic Research, n.d.a). Recession_or_Not is dummy 
coded (1 = recession; 0 = not) and is at the national level.  
 Response variables. This study has two main response (dependent) variables that 
focus on the economy’s impact on various aspects of MFIP participants’ employment 
opportunities: earned income and work hours. The first response variable is earnings per 
month (EarnedIncome), MFIP participants’ gross income, measured in dollars earned per 
month. The second response variable is the number of hours worked per month 
(MAXISHours), measured in hours worked per month. It is important to note that the 
MFIP cash portion is calculated based on the gross income reported, but 40% of the gross 
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income is disregarded (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2017a). Income in the 
EarnedIncome variable only includes that which is from employment; the cash portion is 
not considered income in this variable.  
 A third response variable is used to consider the extent to which economic 
conditions (local and national) impact whether or not MFIP participants earn income. 
This is a dummy variable (Income_or_not), and divides participant observations into two 
categories: income (1), or not (0). It is important to note that the two categories are not 
mutually exclusive; many participants report zero earnings at some point during their 
MFIP participation and earnings at other points. This variable is only used to examine the 
extent to which the predictor variables, particularly those concerning economic 
conditions, impact whether or not MFIP participants earn income. 
 Predictor (control) variables. The following demographic variables will also be 
predictor variables: race, Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education level. Race (Race) 
is operationalized according to Ramsey County’s categories: Asian, African American or 
African Immigrant, Native American, Pacific Islander, White. The population includes 
Native American participants, but none who live on Reservations because there are no 
Reservations in Ramsey County. MFIP participants may identify as more than one race; 
there are 26 race categories in the data, including “unknown.” The researcher combined 
the race categories according to the way Ramsey County collapses them such that six 
race categories remain: Asian, Pacific Islander, Asian/Pacific Islander; African American 
or African Immigrant; Native American; White; Multiple Races; Unknown. Ethnicity 
(Latino_Ethnicity) is defined as Hispanic/Latino/Latina or not because that is how it is 
defined in MAXIS; the researcher acknowledges that it is not possible to represent all 
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ethnicities and will need to rely on Ramsey County’s categorization to convey it at all. 
Gender is defined as female or male. Age (Age) is the current age of the participant for 
each observation. Education (Education) is defined as having a high school diploma/GED 
or not. These control variables were chosen because of previous research showing racial 
disparities in MFIP outcomes, particularly for African Americans (Hollister et al., 2003; 
McDonnell, 2004; DeMaster, 2009; Collins & Xaykaothao, 2015; Minnesota Department 
of Human Services, 2011; Kwon & Meyer, 2011). Given that racial disparities exist, it is 
possible that disparities in Hispanic/Latino/Latina ethnicity are present as well. Although 
the majority of MFIP participants in this population are female, gender is a control 
variable because females are overrepresented in the MFIP population and have 
historically been at a disadvantage for government assistance, being recipients of means-
tested public assistance to a greater extent than social insurance programs like Social 
Security (Abramovitz, 1996; Abramovitz, 2000; Abramovitz, 2001; Brush, 2003; Mink & 
Solinger, 2003). This study controls for age because other studies on low-income families 
consider age and education level as a factor in explaining outcomes (Kwon & Meyer, 
2011; Hanratty, 2016). This study controls for education level to be consistent with 
previous research (Hollister et al., 2003; McDonnell, 2004). Finally, due to the variation 
in the length of time participants utilize MFIP, this study also controls for the number of 
months each person remains in the program (monthcount). 
Limitations of variables 
Predictor (independent) variables. Due to the various ways there are to define 
economic conditions, this study relies on several measures of “recession.” First, it uses a 
dummy coded independent variable to define months in which the United States was in 
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an economic recession, based on NBER’s monthly determination of an economic 
recession at the national level (NBER, n.d.a). Given that this study focuses specifically 
on Ramsey County, Minnesota, national recession data may not accurately reflect local 
economic conditions; therefore, real GDP for the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. 
Paul-Bloomingtin (MN-WI) (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, n.d.), and median income for Ramsey County (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017) are 
used as supplemental economic indicators to reflect the condition of the local economy. 
Data do not exist for metropolitan area real GDP until the year 2001, so it is missing for 
the year 2000. The unemployment rate (Minnesota Department of Employment and 
Economic Development, 2017) is used as a lagging indicator of a recession. The poverty 
rate for Ramsey County (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017) is also used as a lagging indicator, 
and at the time of analysis, poverty rate data were only available through 2015. 
Response variables. MAXISHours and EarnedIncome captures employment and 
earnings reported by participants while participating in MFIP and turning in their 
monthly Household Report Form (HRF), which includes the total number of hours 
worked per month as well as the income earned per month. All MFIP participants are 
required to submit the HRF every month in order to remain active on MFIP. The HRF 
can be mailed, faxed or dropped off in person. The HRF goes to the scan center at 
Ramsey County and gets scanned into the laser fiche system, which sends them to the 
Financial Worker’s laser fiche queue. Then the Financial Worker physically sits at a 
computer and enters these data manually (D. DeMaster, personal communication, May 
31, 2017). Both of these variables are highly reliable and valid because they are required 
for eligibility and grant determination. Financial Workers at Ramsey County enter 
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earnings and employment together, based on the Household Report Form (HRF), which 
participants must complete and submit along with paycheck stubs to their Financial 
Worker. The HRF includes all income reported by participants, including formal labor 
market work and informal work arrangements such as self-employment, like contractors, 
child care providers, and taxi drivers. If a participant is self-employed, there is an indirect 
measure to calculate wage and hours. For example, taxi drivers may wait for a long time 
before a customer requests services. They would report the number of hours they spent 
waiting for business. To calculate the number of hours worked, Financial Workers divide 
the total income by the minimum wage, and that number is entered into MAXIS (M. 
Herzfeld, personal communication, May 12, 2017). In the case of self-employment, 
income may be underreported, but there is no way of knowing the extent to which this 
may or may not happen.  
 Predictor (control) variables. Most of the control variables require little caution 
when assessing their reliability and validity; however, it is important to acknowledge 
some potential issues with how these variables are reported. Race and ethnicity are both 
self-reported, and if this is left blank systematically more frequently with certain races, 
the racial composition of MFIP may not be accurately reflected, and there is no way of 
knowing this. Ethnicity is defined as Hispanic/Latino/Latina or not, so does not capture 
all ethnicities. Gender is coded female or male, and does not accurately reflect 
transgender MFIP participants because there is no transgender option. Age (measured by 
date of birth) is the most accurate. 
Education level is the least reliable and valid of the control variables because it is 
determined at the time of application to MFIP, reflects the level of education at that time, 
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is not reliably updated, and is therefore underreported, especially for those without a high 
school diploma or GED at the time of application. For participants who first apply to 
MFIP while in high school or without a high school diploma/GED and then obtain one 
while receiving MFIP, achieving a high school diploma/GED will be underreported. 
According to the Office of Research and Evaluation Supervisor at Ramsey County, 
variables such as education that don’t affect eligibility, are likely correct at the time of 
MFIP application, but are not updated in MAXIS (D. DeMaster, personal 
communication, May 26, 2017). However, if someone subsequently reapplied for MFIP 
after not having participated in it for several years and had obtained more education since 
prior MFIP applications, education status would be updated then. This study only 
controls for high school education because of the low rates of higher education in this 
population (11.4% of MFIP participants in this dataset have education beyond high 
school). Furthermore, there is no way of knowing if education level data are collected the 
same way, every time, for every person, particularly if the participant is an immigrant, 
and especially if an immigrant is a refugee and is fleeing a country in which there was 
little or no formal education. Validity is also a concern because of how accurately 
education reflects reality. Although education level is not a perfect measure, it is the best 
available.  
The monthcount variable is limited to representing the total number of months 
someone participates in MFIP, and does not account for spells of MFIP participation; if 
someone participated for 20 months, this variable does not show gaps in MFIP 
participation, or if the participant received MFIP for 12 months, exited, reapplied, and 
participated for eight more months. Furthermore, monthcount for the analyses on income 
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and hours only includes the months in which income/hours are reported, so it 
underrepresents the length of time a participant received MFIP for those who, for one or 
more months, report zero income. 
Potentially confounding variables that cannot be assessed. Due to fluctuating 
living, work, financial, and other circumstances which abound in this population, MFIP 
exit status is not a valid control variable because there is no valid way to measure 
participants’ MFIP exit reasons. If someone exited because s/he reached the lifetime 
limit, that person would look the same as someone who exited because s/he found a job 
with a livable wage. Both would simply be “off MFIP” but their living situations could be 
vastly different. Furthermore, if someone MFIP, that person could move to a different 
state, apply for TANF, and continue to receive cash assistance; this person’s exit status 
would provide no more information about why s/he left MFIP in Ramsey County than the 
first two examples. Once participants leave MFIP, they are no longer tracked in MAXIS 
unless they reapply.  
Statistical Methods: Linear Mixed Effects Modeling 
Statistical Software. Data were originally provided in an Excel spreadsheet, were 
cleaned in Excel, and imported into R. R was used for all analyses from descriptive 
statistics to running the mixed effects models (R Core Team, 2016). R is a powerful 
statistical package that offers many options for analysis and can handle large, 
complicated datasets with missing values (i.e. variation in the number of observations for 
each individual results in purposefully missing data). 
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics (including the creation of new 
dummy variables) were done on the control and dependent variables prior to analyses, 
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using R (R Core Team, 2016) and the following R packages: readxl (Wickham & Bryan, 
2017), dplyr (Wickham, Francois, Henry, & Muller, 2017), lubridate (Grolemund & 
Wickham, 2011), reshape2 (Wickham, 2007), and ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009). Upon 
receiving and reviewing the data, the researcher began by running descriptive statistics to 
understand the data and determine the best statistical methods to answer the research 
questions and account for the numerous types of MFIP participation circumstances. 
Existing knowledge of the MFIP population informed the researcher’s decision to start 
with descriptive statistics, although based on input from statisticians, mixed effects 
models were the method of choice prior to completing descriptive statistics. Analyses 
were done at the individual level because each parent in a family with two MFIP-eligible 
adults is required to participate in Employment Services and reports income and hours 
separately to the Financial Worker.  
Due to the complexity of the dataset, descriptive statistics were done in two ways 
as a means to understand the data and to confirm that mixed effects models would be the 
best statistical methods to use during analysis. First, the participant IDs were 
unduplicated such that each of the 53,007 participants had one race, one Latino ethnicity 
code, one gender, one age (the mean age of all of the months s/he was active on MFIP), 
and one level of education (if someone completed a high school diploma or GED while 
active on MFIP and it was updated in the MAXIS database, the higher level of education 
was used). If participants reported more than one race or race combination (as in cases 
that were re-opened and a different race was reported), the most recent race reported was 
used for that participant. If Latino ethnicity was reported as both yes and no, the last 
entered report of Latino ethnicity was used. If participants reported both female and male 
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for gender (this was the case for 31 individual participants), the last entered report of 
gender was used, according to recommendations by the Supervisor of Ramsey County’s 
Office of Research and Evaluation (D. DeMaster, personal communications, August 2 
and 3, 2017). Second, the researcher considered the composition of MFIP participants 
over time; each of the 204 months has a unique demographic composition in terms of 
race, Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education. Descriptive statistics were also done 
separately for working participants. Findings from the descriptive statistics tests are 
discussed in the Findings chapter.  
The results from the descriptive statistics tests provide insight into Ramsey 
County’s MFIP population’s demographics between January 2000 and December 2016. 
Descriptive statistics were run on the entire dataset of 53,007 participants, and again on 
the datasets for only those who report income (n = 34,437) and work hours (n = 34,485) 
to see if there were sizable differences between the working and non-working 
participants. 
Justification for mixed effects modeling. MFIP is designed so that participants 
may be active in the program for a few months, end their participation, and reapply so 
they can participate in it again. There are multiple observations per participant during the 
204-month time frame for this study. Each participant has a minimum of three 
observations (three months of being active on MFIP), based on inclusion criteria set by 
the researcher. There is no maximum number of observations except for the 204-month 
duration of the analysis, and the maximum number of months reported in this dataset is 
204 (19 participants of the 53,007 received MFIP for all 204 months). Due to the 60-
month lifetime limit, most participants will have fewer than 60 observations; however, 
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TANF allows states to grant extensions to up to 20% of their caseloads. Given that there 
are repeated observations (ReportMonth) for each individual, that the number of 
observations differs across individuals, and that there are varying lengths of time between 
each observation, data analysis for this study requires sophisticated statistical methods to 
account for missing data (for example, the vast majority of participants will not have 
every ReportMonth because most do not participate in MFIP for more than 60 months), 
and multiple observations that are likely dependent on each other. Simple linear 
regression assumes independent observations, but repeated observations of the same 
individual are inherently correlated with each other, and therefore not independent 
(Winter, 2013). Repeated measures in simple linear regression assumes that each 
participant is observed the same number of times, and with the same amount of time 
passing between each observation, which is not a realistic representation of MFIP 
participants. Therefore, linear regression is insufficient for these analyses because it 
cannot account for the relationships between each observation of each individual 
participant. A sample of participants could have been drawn such that this study would 
include participants who meet more stringent selection criteria (for example, participants 
who received MFIP for the same set number of months in a particular time period to fit a 
linear regression model), but that would have considerably reduced generalizability 
because it would exclude participants who are active on MFIP for a short time as well as 
long-term MFIP users, who are a highly vulnerable subset of the population.  
The method of choice is hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), also known as 
mixed effects modeling and multilevel modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Mixed 
effects modeling “is generally more flexible in terms of its data requirements because the 
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repeated observations are viewed as nested within the person rather than as the same 
fixed set for all persons as in [multivariate repeated measures methods]. In an HLM, both 
the number of observations per person and the spacing among observations may vary” 
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992, p. 133). Mixed effects modeling can handle the complexities 
of large datasets with missing values (in this case, data will be missing for the months in 
which a participant is not active on MFIP), and with multiple levels of data in which 
variables are nested within each other (in this case, ReportMonth, or time/observation is 
nested within each individual MFIP participant), resulting in non-independence of 
residuals. Figure 4.1 shows a visual representation of the nesting structure, and uses five 
fictitious participants as an example. In the mixed effects models used for analyses, time 
is nested within each person; the inner boxes with months and years represent the first 
level of the nesting structure, the multiple observations within each person. The outer 
boxes represent the second level of the nesting structure, each individual participant and 
her/his characteristics, to show the between-person differences that could impact income 
and work hours.  
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Figure 4.1. Nesting Structure 
 
Mixed effects modeling is a powerful statistical method for analyzing longitudinal 
panel data when participants have multiple observations over varying lengths of time, and 
is particularly appropriate for this dataset because it can handle the relationship between 
repeated observations within each individual (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). 
Given the cyclical nature of poverty and cash assistance receipt, it is necessary to 
use mixed effects models that are able to adequately address questions regarding variance 
in MFIP participants’ employment outcomes. By doing so, the researcher will be able to 
consider participants who use MFIP briefly, for lengthy spells, and those who participate 
multiple times with varying lengths of spells. Clearly, many factors are at work when 
examining any employment data for welfare reform. By considering several predictor 
variables, including economic indicators and person-level differences, mixed effects 
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modeling allows the researcher to explain the extent to which the economy can account 
for differences in employment opportunities for MFIP participants, and whether or not 
the economy plays a statistically significant role in the variation of hours worked and 
earnings.  
Fitting the first model and testing assumptions. R, with the ggplot2, lme4, 
lmerTest, nlme, and lattice packages, was used to test for assumptions and to run linear 
mixed effects analyses on the effects of economic conditions on income earned and hours 
worked (R Core Team, 2016; Wickham, 2009; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; 
Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2016; Pinheiro, J., Bates, D., DebRoy, S., Sarkar, 
D., & R Core Team, 2017; Sarkar, D., 2008). (For a detailed description of the models 
and the R code used to run them, please see Appendices C and D.) 
Prior to determining the final mixed effects model for analysis, a linear mixed 
effects model was fit for the entire dataset. The residual plot revealed non-linearity and a 
non-normal distribution. Data were skewed because a large proportion of MFIP 
participants report zero income and work hours. Using a linear model on a non-linear 
dataset would render meaningless interpretation of the results; Singer & Willett (2003) 
recommend using a square root transformation on multi-level, longitudinal data to 
assume linearity at each level, and suggest that it is preferred to “fit a linear model to 
transformed variables instead of a nonlinear model to raw variables” (p. 76). 
Understanding that this works better for response variables with arbitrary scaling, as in 
Likert responses, results for this analysis are interpreted with caution because they are no 
longer meaningful in dollar-for-dollar or hour-for-hour amounts. Transforming the 
response variable reduces meaning, but increases the ability of the model to draw 
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important conclusions about the relationship between economic conditions and MFIP 
participants’ employment opportunities. 
To address the problems of heteroscedasticity and non-normality, participants 
with zero income and zero work hours were removed from the final model, and the data 
were square root transformed. Transforming the data allowed for the fit of a linear mixed 
effects model that provides insight into the impact of economic conditions on MFIP 
participants who are earning income. Excluding those with zero income improved 
normality in the data, which resulted in better representation of those who are working. 
MFIP participants report zero income for a variety of reasons, which may not have 
anything to do with economic conditions or lack of available work. For example, perhaps 
they are exempt from participating in Employment Services (for reasons such as caring 
for an infant or ill family member, being a new immigrant, or having a domestic violence 
waiver), in which case they do not need to be looking for work or working. However, 
many people who are exempt from Employment Services choose to work anyway, and 
their data are included for the months they report income.   
Fitting the final models. Due to the myriad ways to assess the impact of 
economic conditions on MFIP participants’ employment opportunities, three main 
models were fit, one for each response variable: 1) Income_or_Not, 2) EarnedIncome, 
and 3) MAXISHours. These models address the main research question in several parts. 
Figure 4.2 shows a visual representation of the three main models.  
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Figure 4.2. Three Main Models 
 
First, a model was fit to assess economic conditions on whether or not MFIP 
participants earn income. The corresponding research question is: to what extent does the 
condition of the economy predict whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn 
income? Second, two models were fit to assess economic conditions on Ramsey County 
MFIP participants’ earned income. The corresponding research question for these models 
is: to what extent do economic conditions, as measured by Recession_or_Not, 
RealGDP_Metro, and RamseyCountyUnempl_Rt (the first model), and as measured by 
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MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo (the second model), influence 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in terms of earnings?  
Third, two models were fit to assess economic conditions on Ramsey County MFIP 
participants’ work hours. The corresponding research question for these models is: to 
what extent do economic conditions, as measured by Recession_or_Not, 
RealGDP_Metro, and RamseyCountyUnempl_Rt (the first model), and as measured by 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo (the second model), influence 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in terms of hours worked? 
An additional model was run for hours, which considers the impact of time on hours 
worked; this model replaces all economic indicator predictor variables with dummy-
coded year variables to show how work hours change between 2001 and 2016. (A time 
effects model was not run on the income response variable because participants’ income 
is not adjusted for inflation.). The corresponding research question for that model is: to 
what extent does time, particularly during the years in which the United States 
experienced two economic recessions, influence Ramsey County MFIP participants’ 
employment opportunities in terms of work hours?  
Unconditional models. To begin estimating a mixed effects model, an 
unconditional (or null) model should be fit (Hayes, 2006). A null model is a model 
without predictors (in this case, the variables for individual factors and economic 
conditions are left out of the model), and assesses the between-person differences in 
MFIP participants on the outcome variables, earned income and hours worked. For 
example, do MFIP participants differ from each other, on average, in their income earned 
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and hours worked? (The below example of the null model uses EarnedIncome as the 
response variable; a null model with MAXISHours was also fit, but is not shown here.) 
 
Level 1: Ytj = b0j + rtj (EarnedIncometj = Participantj + rtj) 
Level 2: b0j = g00 + u0j (Mean_EarnedIncome0j = Grand_Mean_EarnedIncome00 + u0j) 
 
 
In the Level 1 null model, Ytj is how much income is earned by participant j in 
month t, b0j is the average income participant j earns, and rtj is the difference between 
participant j’s average earnings and how much participant j earns in month t (the residual 
error at Level 1). In the Level 2 null model, g00 is the grand mean, the average income all 
MFIP participants earn aggregated across participants, and u0j is the difference between 
participant j’s average and g, the grand mean (the error term at Level 2, or the random 
intercept). 
 
The null mixed effects model combines Levels 1 and 2: 
 
 
Ytj = g00 + u0j + rtj (EarnedIncometj = Grand_Mean_EarnedIncome00 + u0j + rtj) 
 
 
In the null mixed effects model, participant j’s income (Y) in month t (Ytj) is a 
function of three contributing factors: MFIP participants’ average earned income (g00), 
the difference between participant j’s average income and the grand mean for all MFIP 
participants (u0j), and the difference between participant j’s income in month t and 
participant j’s own average income (rtj). This model assumes a random intercept 
consisting of the grand mean of participant income (g00) added to the difference between 
each participant’s income and the grand mean (u0j), which allows for the model to 
account for participants starting at different income levels when they apply for MFIP; 
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(g00+ u0j). The difference between participant j’s average earnings and how much 
participant j earns in month t (rtj) is the residual error from the Level 1 null model 
(Hayes, 2006). The null model for hours worked (MAXISHours) is the same, except 
MAXISHours becomes the response variable.  
Conditional models: correlations between predictors. Because real GDP is used 
to help determine whether or not the economy is in a recession, and because median 
income, unemployment rate, and poverty rate are all lagging indicators of recessions, 
collinearity between the economic conditions predictor variables was assumed (see 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4; due to the scaling of the variables, the relationships between the 
economic indicators are shown on two graphs, Figures 4.3 and 4.4).  
Figure 4.3. National Recessions, Local Real GDP, Ramsey County Unemployment Rate, 
and Ramsey County Poverty Rate Between 2000 and 2016 
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 Figure 4.3 shows how local real GDP, Ramsey County unemployment rate, and 
Ramsey poverty rate changes over time. The left-side y-axis shows real GDP for the 
metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI in millions of 2009 
chained dollars). The right-side y-axis shows the poverty rate for Ramsey County and the 
unemployment rate for Ramsey County in per cents. The bars represent the two 
recessions that occurred within the duration of this study (a shorter recession from March 
2001 – December 2001, and the Great Recession, from December 2007 – May 2009). 
Figure 4.3 indicates that the unemployment rate and poverty rate remained fairly stable 
during the 2001 recession, and increased slightly in 2002. The years between 2004 and 
2006 show that unemployment decreased while poverty increased, and both rose sharply 
after the Great Recession began, as the local real GDP was decreasing. Both 
unemployment and poverty show a downward trend after 2012, but overall, poverty 
remains higher than it was before the start of the Great Recession.  
 	 59 
Figure 4.4. National Recessions, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County Median Income 
Between 2000 and 2016 
 
 Figure 4.4 shows how local real GDP and the median income for Ramsey County 
change over time, and that neither started to drop until well into the Great Recession of 
2007 – 2009. The left-side y-axis shows real GDP for the metropolitan area of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI in millions of 2009 chained dollars). The 
right-side y-axis shows Ramsey County’s median income (in tens of thousands of 
dollars). Figure 4.4 indicates that local real GDP and median income stayed 
approximately the same during the 2001 recession, but the local real GDP increased 
sharply once it ended, and increased steadily over the next few years. Local real GDP and 
median income remained fairly stable until around early 2009, months before the Great 
Recession ended; in early 2009, both dropped, and remained lower until the end of 2009, 
and then began to increase again. This is evidence of the national recession’s lagging 
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impact on the local economy. In terms of economic recovery from the Great Recession, 
when comparing real GDP to poverty and unemployment (Figure 4.3), and real GDP to 
median income (Figure 4.4), median income increases at approximately the same rate as 
real GDP, whereas there is not a comparable decline in poverty and unemployment. This 
indicates that while the increase in median income shows evidence of economic recovery, 
the slower decrease in poverty and unemployment is evidence of slower recovery for 
those who have lower incomes and are more economically vulnerable. 
A correlation table was created to assess the degree of correlation between these 
predictors. Given the high collinearity between the local economic indicators: 
RealGDP_Metro and MedianIncome_RamseyCo (0.92), RealGDP_Metro and 
PovertyRate_RamseyCo (0.74), MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo 
(0.72), and between Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt and PovertyRate_RamseyCo (0.65), 
models with the three response variables (Income_or_not, EarnedIncome, and 
MAXIXHours) were run twice, each time with different economic conditions predictor 
variables to address the possibility that the collinear variables could unpredictably 
account for the shared variance that is also shared with the response variables (see Table 
4.1). 
Table 4.1. Correlations Between Local Economic Indicators 
 
 Local  
Real GDP 
Ramsey Co. 
Median Income 
Ramsey Co. 
Unemployment Rate 
Ramsey Co.  
Poverty Rate 
Local Real GDP 1 0.92 -0.06 0.74 
Ramsey Co. Median Income 0.92 1 0.08 0.72 
Ramsey Co. Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.06 0.08 1 0.65 
Ramsey Co. Poverty Rate 0.74 0.72 0.65 1 
 
 	 61 
The models for the Income_or_Not response variable include 1) RealGDP_Metro 
and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt (and Recession_or_Not as the national recession 
variable), and 2) MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo (and 
Recession_or_Not as the national recession variable). There is debate among statisticians 
with regard to addressing collinearity in predictor variables; one method is to remove one 
or more of them even though this results in the inability to compare predictors to each 
other (Mason and Perreault, 1991). Given that the data for these analyses required 
transformation to meet the assumptions of normality, the coefficients cannot be 
interpreted in a way that shows which predictors are more significant than others. 
Transformed data does not produce literally interpretable coefficients. Therefore, separate 
models were run to address the issue of collinearity, knowing that this only provides a 
partial explanation in variance of income and work hours. 
Conditional models: U.S. recession, Metro GDP, and Ramsey County 
unemployment rate as predictors. To look at the impact of economic conditions and 
person-level differences on MFIP participants’ income and work hours, predictor 
variables for economic conditions and person-level differences are added to the equation 
and this replaces the unconditional model with a conditional model, which creates 
regression models for each MFIP participant j (Woltman, Feldstain, MacKay, & Rocci, 
2012). The mixed effects model applies to the two main response variables in this study, 
EarnedIncome and MAXISHours, and the additional Income_or_not response variable 
that includes all of the MFIP participants, regardless of whether or not they are working; 
however, only one model is presented here. The only part that changes for MAXISHours 
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and Income_or_not is that Ytj (EarnedIncome) would become Ytj (MAXISHours) and Ytj (Income_or_not), 
respectively. 
Level 1: time-level variables (tj) 
Ytj(EarnedIncome) = b0j + b1j(Age)Xtj + b2(Recession_or_Not)jXtj + b3(RealGDP_Metro)jXtj 
+ b4(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt)jXtj + b5(monthcount)jXtj + rtj(residual error)  
 
Level 2: person-level variables (0j) 
b0j = g00 + g0-6(Race) + g70(Latino Ethnicity) + g80(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g90(Gender) + u0j(random intercept) +  
b1j = g10(Age) 
b2j = g20(Recession_or_Not) 
b3j = g30(RealGDP_Metro) 
b4j = g40(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt) 
b5j = g50 + u5j(monthcount + random slope for monthcount) 
 
  
The conditional model contains two levels, representing time nested in 
participants. The time variables are at Level 1, and the person variables are at Level 2.  
Level 1. In the Level 1 model, Ytj is how much income is earned by participant j in 
month t. b0j is the average income participant j earns (the intercept, or the predicted value 
of participant j’s income as a function of the predictor variables). Adding the predictor 
variables X, b1jXtj + b2 jXtj + b3jXtj + b4jXtj + b5jXtj, quantifies the relationship between 
participant j’s earned income in month t as a function of all Level 1 predictor variables 
(Age(1), Recession_or_Not(2), RealGDP_Metro(3), Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt(4), and 
monthcount(5)) and represents the slope of the regression lines, or the predicted change in 
MFIP participants’ earned income corresponding to a change in the predictor variables. 
Finally, rtj is the difference between participant j’s average earnings and how much 
participant j earns in month t (the residual error). 
Level 2. The Level 2 model contains the Level 1 predictors for person j at time t, 
and the Level 2 predictors. In the Level 2 model, b0j is equal to the sum of g00 (the grand 
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mean of all MFIP participants’ earnings aggregated across participants) and all of the 
Level 2 predictor variables (Race(0-6, for the six categories of this variable), Latino Ethnicity(7), 
HS_GED_or_NOT(8), and Gender(9)), and the random intercept, u0j, the difference 
between each participant’s income and the grand mean. Including a random intercept for 
participant accounts for variance in income at the time of MFIP application. It is 
assumed that MFIP participants do not begin MFIP with the same income level (i.e. when 
personj(1) applied for MFIP, her/his earnings would likely be different from personj(2) at 
that person’s time of application), and including a random intercept accounts for that 
variation. 
 
The mixed effects model combines Levels 1 and 2: 
 
 
Ytj (EarnedIncome) = g00 + (g10(Age)Xtj) + (g20 (Recession_or_Not)jXtj) + (g30(RealGDP_Metro)jXtj) 
+ (g40(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt)jXtj) + (g50(monthcount)jXtj) + g0-6(Race) + g70(Latino Ethnicity) + 
g80(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g90(Gender) + u5j(random slope for monthcount) + u0j(random intercept) + rtj(residual error)  
 
 
Mixed effects model. In the mixed effects model, the predicted value of Y, earned 
income, equals the grand mean of all participants’ aggregated earned income, plus the 
grand mean change in earned income per every unit increase in the Level 1 predictor 
variables, plus the grand mean of each Level 2 predictor variable, plus the random slope 
for monthcount (u5j, which accounts for variation in the rate at which participants earn 
income), plus the random intercept (u0j, the difference between an individual’s earned 
income at the time of MFIP application and the grand mean of earned income), plus the 
residual error (rtj). 
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Fixed and random effects. The fixed and random effects stay the same for each of 
the models, and the model with EarnedIncome as the response variable is used to explain 
the fixed and random effects for each of the models. In this equation, EarnedIncometj is 
dependent (response) variable, predicted by Race, Latino Ethnicity, Education, Gender, 
Age, Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_MN, RealGDP_Metro, MedianIncome_RamseyCo, 
Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt, and monthcount. Although variation may exist, the model 
estimates the predictor variables as fixed effects because they are the same across 
individuals. For example, economic conditions are the same for each individual; person-
level differences exist between individuals, but not within an individual. The Level 2 
fixed effects stay the same within each participant. Although the Level 1 fixed effects 
change over time, they change in the same way across participants (for example, the 
unemployment rate will change in the same way for every participant). The variable 
monthcount is used as both a Level 1 predictor variable (a fixed effect) and the random 
slope (u5j, a random effect). It is a predictor variable because it is assumed that there is 
variation in the length of time participants receive MFIP assistance. For example, one 
person may participate in MFIP for 15 months, and another may participate for 40 
months. The length of time someone participates in MFIP could impact her/his earned 
income. The variable monthcount is also included as a random slope (random effect) 
because it is assumed that participants earn income at varying rates, and u5j accounts for 
each participant’s unique slope. For example, two people could apply for MFIP with 
incomes of $200/month, and both may participate for 15 months, but one exits earning 
$400/month and the other exits earning $800/month.  
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The other random effect in the mixed effects equation is u0j, which is the random 
intercept. The model has a random intercept because it is assumed that there is 
considerable variability in income across participants when they apply for MFIP, and u0j 
accounts for different starting points for each participant. For example, one person may 
be earning $500/month at the time of MFIP application, and another could be earning 
$200/month. The random intercept allows for such variation.  
Hypothesis. The hypothesis for the conditional models with Recession_or_Not, 
RealGDP_Metro, and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt as predictor variables is: 
Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_Metro, and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt have a significant 
impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income, and on their 
earnings and work hours. 
Conditional models: Ramsey County Median Income and Ramsey County 
poverty rate as predictors. The following conditional models replace Recession_or_Not, 
RealGDP_Metro, and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt with MedianIncome_RamseyCo and 
PovertyRate_RamseyCo. The equations for these models are the same as the previous 
ones, minus one economic conditions predictor. These models apply to the other response 
variables, MAXISHours and Income_or_not, in which Ytj(EarnedIncome) would become 
Ytj(MAXISHours) and Ytj(Income_or_not). (The model with Income_or_not as the response variable 
also includes Recession_or_Not as a predictor; this particular variable was removed for 
the other conditional models after having shown no significance in the models run on 
Income_or_not, EarnedIncome, and MAXISHours.) 
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Level 1: time-level variables (tj) 
 
Ytj(EarnedIncome) = b0j + b1j(Age)Xtj + b2(MedianIncome_RamseyCo)jXtj + b3(PovertyRate_RamseyCo)jXtj 
+ b4(monthcount)jXtj + rtj(residual error)  
 
Level 2: person-level variables (0j) 
 
b0j = g00 + g0-6(Race) + g70(Latino Ethnicity) + g80(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g90(Gender) + u0j(random intercept)  
b1j = g10(Age) 
b2j = g20(MedianIncome_RamseyCo) 
b3j = g30(PovertyRate_RamseyCo) 
b4j = g40 + u4j(monthcount + random slope for monthcount) 
 
The mixed effects model combines Levels 1 and 2: 
 
Ytj (EarnedIncome) = g00 + (g10(Age)Xtj) + (g20 (MedianIncome_RamseyCo)jXtj) + (g30(PovertyRate_RamseyCo)jXtj) 
+ (g40(monthcount)jXtj) + g0-6(Race) + g70(Latino Ethnicity) + g80(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g90(Gender) + u4j(random 
slope for monthcount) + u0j(random intercept) + rtj(residual error)  
 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis for the conditional models with 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo as predictor variables is: 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo have a significant impact on 
whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income, and on their earnings and 
work hours. 
Conditional model: time effects as predictors. The following model looks at the 
effect of time on Ramsey County MFIP participants’ work hours. The time effects model 
only applies to hours because income, unless adjusted for inflation, is not comparable 
across time in the same way work hours are. 
 
Level 1: time-level variables (tj) 
 
Ytj(MAXISHours) = b0j + b1j(Age)Xtj + b2(year_2001)jXtj + b3(year_2002)jXtj + b4(year_2003)jXtj + 
b5(year_2004)jXtj  
+ b6(year_2005)jXtj + b7(year_2006)jXtj + b8(year_2007)jXtj + b9(year_2008)jXtj + b10(year_2009)jXtj  
+ b11(year_2010)jXtj + b12(year_2011)jXtj + b13(year_2012)jXtj + b14(year_2013)jXtj  
+ b15(year_2014)jXtj  + b16(year_2015)jXtj + b17(year_2016)jXtj + rtj(residual error)  
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Level 2: person-level variables (0j) 
 
b0j = g00 + gk-19(Race) + g20,0(Latino Ethnicity) + g21,0(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g22,0(Gender) + u0j(random intercept) 
+ 
b1j = g10(Age) 
b2j = g20(year_2001) 
b3j = g30(year_2002) 
b4j = g40(year_2003) 
b5j = g50(year_2004) 
b6j = g60(year_2005) 
b7j = g70(year_2006) 
b8j = g80(year_2007) 
b9j = g90(year_2008) 
b10j = g10(year_2009) 
b11j = g11(year_2010) 
b12j = g12(year_2011) 
b13j = g13(year_2012) 
b14j = g14(year_2013) 
b15j = g15(year_2014) 
b16j = g16(year_2015) 
b17j = g17(year_2016) + u18j(random slope for monthcount) 
 
The mixed effects model combines Levels 1 and 2: 
 
Ytj (MAXISHours) = g00 + (g10(Age)Xtj) + (g20 (year_2001)jXtj) + (g30(year_2002)jXtj) 
+ (g40(year_2003)jXtj) + (g50(year_2004)jXtj) + (g60(year_2005)jXtj) + (g70(year_2006)jXtj) + 
(g80(year_2007)jXtj) + (g90(year_2008)jXtj) + (g10,0(year_2009)jXtj) + (g11,0(year_2010)jXtj) + 
(g12,0(year_2011)jXtj) + (g13,0(year_2012)jXtj) + (g14,0(year_2013)jXtj) + (g15,0(year_2014)jXtj) + 
(g16,0(year_2015)jXtj) + (g17,0(year_2016)jXtj) + gk-19(Race) + g20,0(Latino Ethnicity) + 
g21,0(HS_GED_or_NOT) + g22,0(Gender) + u18j(random slope for monthcount) + u0j(random intercept) + 
rtj(residual error)  
 
 
 The time effects model replaces the economic conditions predictor variables with 
year variables as a means to consider the impact of time, regardless of economic 
conditions. There is also no monthcount predictor variable in this model because having 
an extra time variable in the equation generated errors when running the model; however, 
monthcount is still a random slope. The hypothesis for the time effects model is: Time 
has a significant impact on predicting Ramsey County MFIP participants’ work hours. 
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Re-testing assumptions. To make sure the transformed data were a good fit for 
the model, tests were run to confirm the assumptions of linear mixed effects models were 
sufficiently met. 
Assumption 1. rtj ~ N(0, sA2): The error (r) for participant j at time t is normally 
distributed (N) with a mean of zero and some constant variance, sA2, which is the 
specified covariance structure: there is variability within subject (variability from month 
to month); the model uses an AR1 covariance structure, which means that month 1 is 
correlated with month 2. In other words, multiple observations in months for each 
participant are inherently related to each other and therefore, not independent. Using the 
AR1 covariance structure accounts for this.  
Assumption 2. Participantj ~ N(0, sB): The random intercept (Participantj) is 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and some constant; each participant is 
independent of one another. This dataset includes two-parent families, which conflicts 
with this assumption to some extent because individual participants in two-parent 
families are not independent of one another. However, this assumption is reasonably 
satisfied because two-parent families comprise approximately 25% of the data; and it can 
be assumed that 75% of the participants are independent of one another. Furthermore, of 
those who are in two-parent families, many are single-parent families for part of their 
time on MFIP. 
Assumption 3. rtj ^ Subjectj: The error (r) for participant j at time t is independent 
the random intercept. 
The residual plots and Q-Q plots in Appendix A show these assumptions are 
reasonably satisfied for the models that include only those earning income and reporting 
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work hours. The models that include all participants and assesses the impact of economic 
conditions on whether or not MFIP participants earn income do not sufficiently meet 
these assumptions; therefore, results are limited and interpreted with caution. The 
residual plots and Q-Q plots for these models are in Appendix B. 
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Chapter 5 
Findings 
 This chapter presents the findings of the linear mixed effects models described in 
the previous chapter. It begins with a discussion of what the descriptive statistics show, 
which is necessary to provide a clearer representation of the population and how it 
changes over time. Then, it parses apart the main research question regarding the 
economy’s impact on Ramsey County MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours. This 
is divided into several sections. First, the findings are described for the model that tests 
for the economy’s impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn 
income. Second, the null and conditional models for working participants are described. 
Finally, the results of the conditional models for the economy’s impact on income earned, 
and the economy’s impact on hours worked are presented. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics on MFIP participants who earn income do not differ much 
from the entire population; this indicates that the working and non-working participants 
are similar. Since the descriptive statistics on income-earning participants closely reflect 
that of the entire population, it could be assumed that many of those who are not earning 
income at one point, eventually do. The categories for those reporting income and those 
with zero income are not mutually exclusive. The descriptive statistics do not reflect 
those who never report income versus those who do; participants who report income for 
any months during their MFIP participation and also report zero income in other months 
appear in both sets of descriptive statistics. The final analyses include observations for 
anyone who is working, regardless of whether they reported zero income at some point. 
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(There are 48 more participants who reported work hours than who reported income; this 
could be due to errors or people reporting hours for which they are not paid. Due to the 
possibility of the latter, those who reported hours but not income are kept in the 
analyses.) 
Control variables. Due to the complexity of running descriptive statistics on a 
population in which there is substantial demographic variation, Table 5.1 shows a 
summary of the descriptive statistics for race, Latino ethnicity, and gender. It includes 
percentages for the entire dataset, percent ranges to show variation in each of these 
demographics over the 17-year period, and it includes percentages for working 
participants, as well as percent ranges to show variation between 2000 and 2016. 
 
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics on Race, Latino Ethnicity, and Gender 
 
 
All Participants 
 
 
Working Participants 
% of all  
participants 
Lowest and highest 
%  
between 2000-2016 
Average number 
of months in 
MFIP* 
% of working 
participants 
Lowest and highest %  
between 2000-2016 
Race 
     AA 
     AP 
     MR 
     N 
     W 
     U 
 
 
42.6% 
22.4% 
1.7% 
2.7% 
29.4% 
1.1% 
 
32.3% - 53.5% 
14.3% - 24.6% 
0.7% - 3.7% 
2.3% - 3.5% 
21.7% - 32.6% 
0.1% - 1.9% 
 
28.3 months 
23.4 months 
30.3 months 
27.9 months 
24.3 months 
15.8 months 
Race 
     AA 
     AP 
     MR 
     N 
     W 
     U 
 
 
44.8% 
20.0% 
1.8% 
2.3% 
29.8% 
1.1% 
 
32.2% - 63.5% 
12.5% - 27.7% 
0.6% - 3.5% 
1.1% - 2.7% 
18.0% - 33.1% 
0.5% - 2.3% 
 
Ethnicity 
     Latino 
     not Latino 
 
 
5.9% 
94.1% 
 
5.0% - 6.71% 
93.29% - 95.0% 
 
 
26.3 months 
25.8 months 
Ethnicity 
     Latino 
     not 
Latino 
 
   
6.3% 
93.7%   
 
4.3% - 7.7% 
92.3% - 95.7% 
Gender 
     Female 
     Male 
 
 
74.3%  
25.7% 
 
78.7% - 83.3% 
16.6% - 21.3% 
 
27.4 months 
18.8 months 
Gender 
     Female 
     Male 
 
 
74.7% 
23.5% 
 
73.9% - 82.4% 
17.6% - 26.1% 
* Average number of months in MFIP for total population: 25.25 
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Race: All participants. Between January 2000 and December 2016, the racial 
composition of the 53,007 Ramsey County MFIP participants is as follows: 22.4% Asian, 
Pacific Islander, Asian/Pacific Islander; 42.6% African American or African Immigrant; 
2.7% Native American; 29.4% White; 1.7% Multiple Races; and 1.1% Unknown. Race 
composition for the 17-year period for this study changes over time. Asian, Pacific 
Islander, Asian/Pacific Islander ranges from 14.3% at its lowest (June 2004) to 24.6% at 
its highest (April 2006). African American or African Immigrant ranges from 32.3% at 
its lowest (March 2000) to 53.5% at its highest (November 2016). Native American 
ranges from 2.3% at its lowest (July 2008) to 3.5% at its highest (April 2014). White 
ranges from 21.7% at its lowest (June 2016) to 32.6% at its highest (April 2003). 
Multiple Races ranges from 0.7% at its lowest (February 2000) to 3.7% at its highest 
(August 2015). Unknown ranges from 0.01% at its lowest (November 2006) to 1.9% at 
its highest (February 2001). 
Race: Working participants. Between January 2000 and December 2016, the 
racial composition of working participants is as follows: 20.0% Asian, Pacific Islander, 
Asian/Pacific Islander; 44.8% African American or African Immigrant; 2.3% Native 
American; 29.8% White; 1.8% Multiple Races; and 1.1% Unknown. Racial composition 
for Asian, Pacific Islander, Asian/Pacific Islander and African American/African 
Immigrant changes 2.4% and 2.2%, respectively, from the entire population. Percent 
changes in the other race categories is less than 1%. In general, the racial composition of 
working participants reflects the racial composition of the entire dataset. Racial 
composition of working MFIP participants fluctuates for the 17-year period of time this 
study covers. Of those who report earnings, Asian, Pacific Islander, Asian/Pacific 
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Islander comprise between 12.5% (December 2016) and 27.7% (August 2007) of 
working MFIP participants. African Americans or African Immigrants comprise 32.2% 
(March 2000) to 63.5% (December 2016) of working MFIP participants. Native 
Americans make up 1.1% (June 2010) to 2.7% (June 2004) of MFIP workers. Whites 
make up 18.0% (June 2016) to 33.1% (February 2004) of MFIP workers. Multiple Races 
ranges from 0.6% (February 2001) to 3.5% (July 2016), and Unknown race ranges from 
0.05% (January 2007) to 2.3% (July 2005). 
Latino Ethnicity. Of the 53,007 Ramsey County MFIP participants between 
January 2000 and December 2016, 5.9% identify as Latino and 94.1% do not. Over the 
17-year period for this study, Latino ethnicity ranges from 5.0% at its lowest (January 
2014) to 6.71% (September 2004). Of MFIP participants who are working, 6.3% identify 
as Latino, and 93.7% do not. Over the 17-year period for this study, 4.3% to 7.7% 
identify as Latino (February 2007 and November 2005, respectively). 
Gender. Of the 53,007 Ramsey County MFIP participants between January 2000 
and December 2016, 74.3% are female and 25.7% are male. When looking at the gender 
composition of this population over the time period for this study to see if it changes 
month-to-month, females comprise 78.7%-83.3% of MFIP-eligible adults, and males 
comprise 16.6%-21.3% of MFIP-eligible adults in any given month. The gender 
percentages are higher when looking at monthly composition because females tend to 
participate in MFIP for an average of 27 months, whereas males’ MFIP duration is about 
19 months; thus, this increases the percentage of female MFIP participants per month. It 
is also important to note that 89.0% of the single-parent families in this study are headed 
by females, and 11.0% are headed by males. Females are overrepresented in single-parent 
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households. In terms of working MFIP participants, gender composition reflects the full 
dataset. Of working participants, 74.7% are female, and 25.3% are male. Over time, 
females comprise between 73.9% and 82.4% of working MFIP participants (and males 
comprise between 17.6% and 26.1% of working MFIP participants).  
Age. The mean age for Ramsey County MFIP participants between January 2000 
and December 2016 is 30.8 years for all participants in this population. Since participants 
under age 18 who have not graduated from high school have school-focused Employment 
Services, it is important to note that in this population, 4.1% of the participants are ages 
16 or 17, and likely working on finishing high school instead of working in the formal or 
informal labor market. Approximately 85.4% of the participants in this study who are 
ages 16 or 17 do not have income and work hours reported; approximately 14.6% do. The 
mean age of participants with income is 30 years, which is nearly the same as the mean 
age of the entire population. 
Education. Individual participant IDs were unduplicated such that each 
participant occurred once in the descriptive statistics. If more than one education level 
was associated with an individual, the highest level was chosen. Results showed that 
39.4% of the participants in this population do not have a high school diploma or GED, 
and 60.6% do. For MFIP participants earning income, 40.9% do not have a high school 
diploma or GED, and 59.1% do. 
Dependent variables: income and hours. When considering the entire 53,007 
participants over the course of January 2000 until December 2016, approximately 69% of 
MFIP participants report having earned income and work hours at some point during 
their MFIP participation. This percentage changes when looking at earned income work 
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hours over time; in any given month between January 2000 and December 2016, 
approximately 25% - 41% of MFIP participants report income and work hours. 
December 2016 had the highest percentage of MFIP participants reporting income and 
hours, and February 2006 had the lowest percentage. These percentages show that people 
do not tend to remain in MFIP for very long once they obtain employment. Monthly 
earnings average $976.70 for those who report income ($545.62 for parents under age 
18); hours worked per month average 102 for those who report hours (67 for parents 
under age 18).  
Upon initial examination of the data, those who were exempt from Employment 
Services were going to be excluded from analyses for the duration of the exemption; 
however, despite being exempt, many participants report income and hours during the 
months they are exempt. For example, over the course of the 17-year period for this 
study, between 12.6% and 55.2% of exempt participants report income and work hours 
while they are exempt from Employment Services. Therefore, all MFIP-eligible adults 
are included for all analyses, regardless of exempt status.  
Mixed Effects Models 
 Impact of economy on earning income or not.  The first models address the 
following research question: to what extent do economic conditions influence whether or 
not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income? The hypothesis is: economic 
conditions have a significant impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants 
earn income. Results of these models must be interpreted with caution because the 
assumptions associated with mixed effects models are not satisfactorily met when 
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including all participants; those with zero income skew the data. Therefore, only results 
from the F-tests are included here, and are shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Local and National Economic Indicators’ Impact on Whether or Not  
MFIP Participants in Ramsey County Earn Income 
 
Model 1: 
 
National Recession 
Local Real GDP 
Ramsey County Unemployment Rate 
Model 2: 
 
National Recession 
Ramsey County Median Income 
Ramsey County Poverty Rate 
ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
National Recession 
 
    0.84 
 
  0.3601 
 
National 
Recession 
    2.37   0.1240 
Local Real GDP     8.8 
 
  0.0030 
 
Ramsey County 
Median Income 
    2.54   0.1111 
Ramsey County 
Unemployment Rate 
734.23 
 
<0.0001 
 
Ramsey County 
Poverty Rate 
492.30 <0.0001 
a = 0.01 
 U.S. Recession and local real GDP. The first model considers the extent to which 
a national recession and real GDP for the metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI impact whether or not MFIP participants earn income. After 
controlling for age, race, Latino Ethnicity, education, and gender, RealGDP_Metro and 
Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt (p = 0.0030, p = <0.0001, respectively) have a significant 
impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income. 
Recession_or_Not (the variable representing a national recession) does not significantly 
impact whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income. The hypothesis is 
partially supported; whether or not the United States is in a national recession does not 
significantly predict earnings, whereas measures of the condition of the local economy, 
the local real GDP and Ramsey County’s unemployment rate, do have a significant 
impact on whether or not MFIP participants earn income. This suggests that the condition 
of the local economy has a larger impact on MFIP participants than does the condition of 
the national economy. 
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 Ramsey County median income and Ramsey County poverty rate. The second 
model considers the extent to which a national recession, and the median income and 
poverty rate for Ramsey County impact whether or not MFIP participants earn income. 
After controlling for age, race, Latino Ethnicity, education, and gender, 
Recession_or_Not and MedianIncome_RamseyCo do not have a significant impact on 
whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income (p = 0.1240 and p = 
0.1111, respectively); PovertyRate_RamseyCo does (p = <0.0001). Again, the hypothesis 
is partially supported; whether or not the United States is in a national recession does not 
significantly predict earnings, nor does the median income of Ramsey County; the 
Ramsey County poverty rate does have a significant impact on whether or not MFIP 
participants earn income. This suggests that the local poverty rate is far more indicative 
of whether or not MFIP participants earn income, which makes sense, given that MFIP 
eligibility depends on having little to no income, and that MFIP participants’ income is 
far below the median income. 
Null models for working participants. The null models do not include a random 
slope because by definition, there are no predictor variables in a null model. To be 
consistent with the conditional models, the AR1 covariance structure is also used in the 
null models.  
Results of the first null model show that 32.0% of the total variation in 
EarnedIncome is due to variation between people; 68.0% is due to within-person 
differences (how much variation occurs from someone’s first MFIP month to the second, 
third, et cetera). Results of the second null model show that 27.6% of the total variation 
in MAXISHours is due to variation between people; 72.4% is due to within-person 
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differences (see Table 5). This is good evidence for using a multi-level model because it 
will provide between-person estimates rather than just within-person (time only) 
estimates. The multi-level model can account for time differences (within a person) and 
person differences (between each participant), rather than only one or the other. 
 
 
Table 5.3. Variance Correlations for Null Models 
 
Model 1: 
EarnedIncome as Response Variable 
Model 2: 
MAXISHours as Response Variable 
                             Variance Std Dev                                      Variance Std Dev 
(Intercept) 39.27108 6.266664 (Intercept) 2.832218 1.68292 
Residual 83.37084 9.130763 Residual 7.427788 2.725397 
 
Conditional models for working participants. The conditional models include 
both a random intercept for person, and a random slope for time because it is assumed 
that MFIP participants neither begin MFIP with the same income and work hours, nor 
progress at the same rate in terms of earnings or hours while participating in MFIP. All of 
the conditional models were fit using Restricted Maximum Likelihood to achieve the 
most accurate variance estimates, which is important for this dataset because of the 
between-person variance shown by the null models (32.0% and 27.6% of the variation in 
income and hours, respectively) is due to differences between individuals. Two main 
conditional models were run, one with EarnedIncome as the response variable, and one 
with MAXISHours as the response variable. 
Random effects for the conditionals model for EarnedIncome show that the 
residual error (rtj) is reduced by 11.7% with Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_Metro, and 
Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt as the predictor variables, and by 13.8% with 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo as the predictor variables. 
Random effects for the conditional model for MAXISHours show that the residual error 
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(rtj) is reduced by 6.7% with Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_Metro, and 
Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt as the predictor variables, and by 6.5% with 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo as the predictor variables. 
Random effects for both response variables are shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.  
 
Table 5.4. Random Effects for National Recession, Local Real GDP,  
and Ramsey County Unemployment Rate 
 
Model 1: 
EarnedIncome as Response Variable 
Model 2: 
MAXISHours as Response Variable 
                             Std Dev Corr                                      Std Dev Corr 
(Intercept) 6.836614 (Intr) (Intercept) 1.7978316 (Intr) 
monthcount 0.1564715 -0.483 monthcount 0.0375611 -0.555 
Residual 8.5436289  Residual 2.6328969  
 
 
 
Table 5.5. Random Effects for Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey County 
 
Model 1: 
EarnedIncome as Response Variable 
Model 2: 
MAXISHours as Response Variable 
                             Std Dev Corr                                      Std Dev Corr 
(Intercept) 6.6427786 (Intr) (Intercept) 1.79382495 (Intr) 
monthcount 0.1575742 -0.456 monthcount 0.03925831 -0.554 
Residual 8.4794474  Residual 2.63599182  
 
Comparing the intercepts of the null and conditional models (Tables 4, 5, and 6) 
provides an estimate of the percentage by which the conditional models impact variation 
in the intercept. To compute this: 
Intercept Variance (from null model) – Intercept Standard Deviation (from conditional model)2 
Intercept Variance (from null model) 
 
Subtracting the conditional squared Intercept Standard Deviation from the null 
model’s Intercept Variance, and then dividing the difference by the null Intercept 
Variance shows that all conditional models increase variation in the intercepts. The 
conditional model for EarnedIncome with the with Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_Metro, 
and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt as the predictor variables increases variation in the 
intercept by 19.0%, and by 12.4% with MedianIncome_RamseyCo and 
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PovertyRate_RamseyCo as the predictor variables. The conditional model for 
MAXISHours increases variation in the intercept by 14.1% with Recession_or_Not, 
RealGDP_Metro, and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt as the predictor variables, and by 
14.0% with MedianIncome_RamseyCo and PovertyRate_RamseyCo as the predictor 
variables. Tables 5 and 6 show that the residual error is reduced by a relatively small 
percentage for all of the conditional models; however, it is important to acknowledge that 
these models only include five control predictors (age, race, Latino ethnicity, education, 
and gender), and two or three economic indicators (Recession_or_Not, RealGDP_Metro, 
and Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt for the first model, and MedianIncome_RamseyCo and 
PovertyRate_RamseyCo for the second model). No model can possibly account for all of 
the individual factors that impact MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours, especially 
given the complexities of their lives. Greater variation shown by the conditional models 
gives a more realistic representation of the variation in MFIP participants’ starting points 
in terms of income and work hours when they first apply for MFIP. 
Conditional model 1: impact of the economy on income earned. The models in 
this section address the following research question: to what extent do economic 
conditions (particularly during economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, 
Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education) influence MFIP participants’ employment 
opportunities in terms of earnings? Figure 5.1 shows changes over time in the 
percentages of MFIP participants in Ramsey County who are earning income. 
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Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the two national recessions that occurred between 2000 and 
2016, along with real GDP for the local metro area. The lower line represents the 
percentages of individual adult MFIP participants who are reporting earned income. It 
tends to fall between 30% and 40% over the entire 17-year period. Although it does not 
appear to change much, it is important to note that this graph reflects the percentages of 
income-earning participants; it does not show how much they earn. Figure 5.1 supports 
what the model with the Income_or_not response variable shows, that recessions tend to 
have little impact as they occur at the national level. 
Predictor variables: U.S. Recession, local real GDP, and Ramsey County 
unemployment rate. ANOVA tests show that the condition of the local economy, as 
measured by real GDP for the metropolitan area for Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
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MN-WI, and the Ramsey County unemployment rate have a significant impact on MFIP 
participants’ earnings (p < 0.0001; a = 0.01), but national recessions do not (p = 0.0222; 
a = 0.01) (see Table 5.6). The hypothesis that economic conditions have a significant 
impact on Ramsey County MFIP participants’ earnings is rejected at the national level, 
but supported at the local level, when measured by the local real GDP and the Ramsey 
County unemployment rate. In terms of the control predictors, race, age, education, and 
gender show significance (all p-values < 0.0001; a = 0.01). Latino ethnicity is not 
significant (in these results) in predicting earnings (p = 0.0312; a = 0.01). The variable 
for time, monthcount, also significantly impacts MFIP participants’ earnings (p < 0.0001; 
a = 0.01).  
 
Table 5.6. ANOVA:  
National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
 
 ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
Race 539 <0.0001 
L_Ethnicity 4.6   0.0312 
Age 1358.9 <0.0001 
Education 213.7 <0.0001 
Gender 404.9 <0.0001 
National Recession 5.2   0.0222 
Local Real GDP 889.1 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Unempl. Rt. 448.7 <0.0001 
monthcount 1462.2 <0.0001 
 a = 0.01 
 
To further examine the variables which have significance, as indicated by the 
ANOVA table, the unstandardized coefficients of the fixed effects show the direction of 
significance (see Table 5.7).  
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Table 5.7. Fixed Effects: 
National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County Unemployment Rate on Earnings 
 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient Std Error df t-value p-value 
Race AA 27.61377 0.1177252 348856 234.56126 0.0000 
Race AP 4.564302 0.1202074 34429 37.97023 0.0000 
Race MR -0.580367 0.3184499 34429 -1.82248 0.0684 
Race N -1.925704 0.2985486 34429 -6.45022 0.0000 
Race U 0.188553 0.4541324 34429 0.41519 0.6780 
Race W -0.249168 0.1055121 34429 -2.36151 0.0182 
L_Ethnicity 0.506634 0.1934215 34429 2.6133 0.0088 
Age 0.095745 0.048605 348856 19.69854 0.0000 
Education 1.04718 0.0767418 348856 13.64551 0.0000 
Gender -2.831054 0.1064497 34429 -26.59522 0.0000 
US Recession 0.129988 0.0610367 348856 2.12967 0.0332 
RealGDP_Metro 0.000048 0.000003 348856 16.04837 0.0000 
RamseyCo_UnemplRt -0.45145 0.0194284 348856 -23.23657 0.0000 
monthcount 0.084741 0.0022161 348856 38.23815 0.0000 
a = 0.01 
Table 5.7 shows that when the real GDP increases, MFIP participants’ earnings 
increase. When the unemployment rate increases, MFIP participants’ earnings decrease. 
Race is significant, but not for all race categories. Because of previous research showing 
African Americans being among the most disadvantaged welfare participants (Sheely, 
2012; Kwon & Meyer, 2011; Hollister et al., 2003; McDonnell, 2004; DeMaster, 2009; 
Collins & Xaykaothao, 2015; Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2011), the race 
category for African American/African Immigrant was used as the comparison race. 
According to the results, Asian/Pacific Islanders earn significantly more than African 
Americans, and Native Americans earn significantly less. All other race categories 
(multiple races, White, and unknown) do not earn significantly more or less than African 
Americans/African Immigrants. Age is also significant; earnings increase as MFIP 
participants get older. Education also significantly impacts MFIP participants’ earnings; 
those with a high school diploma or GED earn significantly more than those who have 
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not finished high school. Gender is also significant. Females earn significantly less than 
males do, even though the majority of MFIP participants are female. Finally, monthcount 
is significant; participants tend to earn more during their later months on MFIP. 
 Predictor variables: Ramsey County median income and Ramsey County 
poverty rate. ANOVA tests show that both median income and poverty rate in Ramsey 
County have a significant impact on MFIP participants’ earnings (p < 0.0001, p = 0.0002, 
respectively; a = 0.01) (see Table 5.8). The hypothesis that local economic conditions, as 
measured by Ramsey County median income and Ramsey County poverty rate, have a 
significant impact on Ramsey County MFIP participants’ earnings is supported. In terms 
of the control predictors, race, age, education, and gender show significance (all p-values 
< 0.0001; a = 0.01). Latino ethnicity is not significant (in these results) in predicting 
earnings (p = 0.0854; a = 0.01). The time variable, monthcount, also significantly 
impacts MFIP participants’ earnings (p < 0.0001; a = 0.01). 
 
Table 5.8. ANOVA:  
Ramsey County Median Income and  
Ramsey County Poverty Rate on Earnings 
 
 ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
Race 565.5 <0.0001 
L_Ethnicity 3   0.0854 
Age 1189.9 <0.0001 
Education 218 <0.0001 
Gender 473.2 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Median Income 466.1 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Poverty Rate 13.5   0.0002 
monthcount 1623.5 <0.0001 
a = 0.01 
 
 The p-values from the ANOVA table indicate which variables are significant in 
predicting differences in MFIP participants’ income. To understand the direction of 
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significance, examining the unstandardized coefficients of the fixed effects (see Table 
5.9).  
 
 
Table 5.9. Fixed Effects: 
Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey County on Earnings 
 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient Std Error df t-value p-value 
Race AA 27.282284 0.1162729 355124 234.64007 0.0000 
Race AP 4.593668 0.1192249 33975 38.52942 0.0000 
Race MR -0.608988 0.3245876 33975 -1.87619 0.0606 
Race N -1.925887 0.2906211 33975 -6.6268 0.0000 
Race U 0.411311 0.4450229 33975 0.92425 0.3554 
Race W -0.208589 0.1034329 33975 -2.01666 0.0437 
L_Ethnicity 0.424628 0.1925108 33975 2.20574 0.0274 
Age 0.087869 0.0047977 355124 18.31469 0.0000 
Education 1.051801 0.0755031 355124 13.93056 0.0000 
Gender -2.841983 0.1052589 33975 -26.99971 0.0000 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo 0.000159 0.0000104 355124 15.27846 0.0000 
PovertyRate_RamseyCo -0.135455 0.0130683 355124 -10.36518 0.0000 
monthcount 0.089738 0.0022272 355124 40.29221 0.0000 
a = 0.01 
 
Table 5.9 shows that when the median income increases, MFIP participants’ 
earnings increase. When the poverty rate increases, MFIP participants’ earnings decrease. 
Race is significant, but not for all race categories. Again, the race category for African 
American/African Immigrant is used as the comparison race. Results are the same as the 
previous model: Asian/Pacific Islanders earn significantly more than African Americans, 
and Native Americans earn significantly less. All other race categories (multiple races, 
White, and unknown) do not earn significantly more or less than African 
Americans/African Immigrants when the economic conditions predictor variables are 
changed. Age is significant; earnings increase as MFIP participants get older. Having a 
high school diploma or GED significantly increases earnings. Gender is significant again. 
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Females earn significantly less than males earn. MFIP participants’ earnings increase 
significantly as they progress through the program. 
 Conditional model 2: Impact of economy on hours worked. The models 
discussed next address the following question: to what extent do economic conditions 
(particularly during economic recessions), and person-level differences (race, Latino 
ethnicity, gender, age, and education) influence MFIP participants’ employment 
opportunities in terms of work hours? Figure 5.2 shows changes over time in the 
percentages of MFIP participants in Ramsey County who are reporting work hours. 
Figure 5.3 shows changes over time in the average number of hours worked per week. 
Figure 5.4 provides a breakdown of people who work less than 15 hours per week, 
between 15 and 24 hours per week, between 25 and 34 hours per week, and 35 or more 
hours per week, and shows how this changes over time. 
Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the two national recessions that occurred between 2000 and 
2016, along with real GDP for the local metro area. The lower line represents the 
percentages of individual adult MFIP participants who are reporting work hours. 
Percentages of those reporting work hours tend to fall between 30% and 40% over the 
entire 17-year period, and closely resemble the pattern from Figure 5.1, which shows the 
percentages of MFIP participants who are earning income. This is to be expected; those 
who earn income correspondingly report work hours. Like the percentages of those 
earning income, the percentages for those reporting work hours do not appear to change 
much, and the graph provides the same information as Figure 5.1 does: the percent of 
working MFIP participants declined slightly during the 2001 recession, and stayed 
approximately between 30% and 35% until a slight increase just before the Great 
Recession, followed by another reduction during the Great Recession until it started 
rising again in 2014, climbing slightly past 40% again by 2016. 
Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 shows the average number of hours worked per week between 2000 
and 2016. The two bars represent the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions. The average 
weekly hours fluctuate between 24 and 27 hours per week, with a relative high in 2007, 
and a relative sharp decline from 2007 to their lowest in 2009. The decrease in work 
hours occurred at the end of the Great Recession; hours steadily increased fairly steadily 
since then. 
Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 Figure 5.4 shows the monthly count of MFIP-eligible adults from 2000 – 2016 as 
a stacked column. Each column is broken down into four ranges of hours worked per 
week: less than 15, 15 to 24, 25-34, and 35 or more. The four ranges of hours remain 
fairly stable over time, relative to caseload size. Late 2009 to early 2010 shows more 
participants working less than 15 hours per week, and fewer participants working 35 or 
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more hours per week compared to most of the other years; aside from that, it appears that 
there is little fluctuation in the distribution of hours worked per week. However, even 
minimal changes in hours can greatly impact MFIP participants’ financial wellbeing. For 
example, if someone is earning the state minimum wage ($7.75/hour in 2017), going 
from 24 hours per week to 30 hours per week means an approximate increase of 
$186/month in gross income. 
Predictor variables: U.S. Recession, local real GDP, and Ramsey County 
unemployment rate. ANOVA tests show that the condition of the local economy, as 
measured by the metropolitan area for Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI, and 
the Ramsey County unemployment rate have a significant impact on MFIP participants’ 
hours (p < 0.0001; a = 0.01), but national recessions do not (p = 0.1699; a = 0.01) (see 
Table 5.10). The hypothesis that economic conditions have a significant impact on 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ work hours is rejected at the national level, but 
supported at the local level, when measured by the local real GDP and the Ramsey 
County unemployment rate. In terms of the control predictors, race, age, and gender show 
significance (all p-values < 0.0001; a = 0.01). Latino ethnicity is not significant (in these 
results) in predicting hours worked (p = 0.0379; a = 0.01). Education is also not 
significant in predicting work hours (p = 0.0750; a = 0.01). 
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Table 5.10. ANOVA: 
National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey 
County Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
 
ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
Race 689.2 <0.0001 
L_Ethnicity 4.3 0.0379 
Age 903.3 <0.0001 
Education 3.2 0.0750 
Gender 435.9 <0.0001 
National Recession 1.9 0.1699 
Local Real GDP 95.4 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Unempl. Rt. 388.7 <0.0001 
monthcount 1016.3 <0.0001 
 a = 0.01 
 
Because the ANOVA table cannot provide the direction of significance, the 
unstandardized coefficients of the fixed effects are necessary to understand how each 
predictor variable impacts MFIP participants’ work hours (see Table 5.11).  
 
Table 5.11. Fixed Effects: 
National Recession, Local Real GDP, and Ramsey County Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked 
 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient Std Error df t-value p-value 
Race AA 9.290082 0.03208305 348744 289.56358 0.0000 
Race AP 1.325995 0.03228163 34477 41.07583 0.0000 
Race MR -0.158615 0.0847623 34477 -1.8713 0.0613 
Race N -0.434261 0.08021405 34477 -5.41378 0.0000 
Race U 0.063817 0.12319849 34477 0.518 0.6045 
Race W -0.154176 0.02831463 34477 -5.44512 0.0000 
L_Ethnicity 0.120082 0.05181033 34477 2.31772 0.0205 
Age 0.022386 0.00131108 348744 17.07459 0.0000 
Education 0.046566 0.02133058 348744 2.18304 0.0290 
Gender -0.749089 0.0287777 34477 -26.03019 0.0000 
US Recession -0.003992 0.01831912 348744 -0.21789 0.8275 
RealGDP_Metro -0.000001 0.00000084 348744 -1.27581 0.2020 
RamseyCo_UnemplRt -0.122289 0.00566581 348744 -21.58368 0.0000 
monthcount 0.018284 0.00057353 348744 31.87965 0.0000 
a = 0.01 
 
Table 5.11 shows that when the real GDP increases, MFIP participants’ hours 
decrease; however, this is not a significant fixed effect, so the impact of GDP on work 
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hours, however significant, is minimal. When the unemployment rate increases, MFIP 
participants’ hours decrease. Race is significant, but not for all race categories. African 
American/African Immigrant is the comparison race, as in the other models. According to 
the results, Asian/Pacific Islanders work significantly more hours than African 
Americans, and Native Americans and Whites work significantly fewer hours. Those 
who identify as having multiple races or unknown races do not work significantly more 
or fewer hours than African Americans/African Immigrants. As with income, age is also 
significant; work hours increase as MFIP participants get older. Gender is also 
significant, as it is with income. Females report significantly fewer work hours than 
males do. Finally, monthcount is significant; participants tend to work more hours during 
their later months on MFIP. 
Predictor variables: Ramsey County median income and Ramsey County 
poverty rate. ANOVA tests show that both median income and poverty rate in Ramsey 
County have a significant impact on MFIP participants’ work hours (p < 0.0001; a = 
0.01) (see Table 5.12). The hypothesis that local economic conditions, as measured by 
Ramsey County median income and Ramsey County poverty rate, have a significant 
impact on Ramsey County MFIP participants’ work hours is supported. In terms of the 
control predictors, race, age, and gender show significance (all p-values < 0.0001; a = 
0.01). Education is barely significant (p = 0.0105; a = 0.01). Latino ethnicity is not 
significant in predicting hours worked (p = 0.0627; a = 0.01). The time variable, 
monthcount, also significantly impacts MFIP participants’ hours (p < 0.0001; a = 0.01). 
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Table 5.12. ANOVA:  
Ramsey County Median Income and  
Ramsey County Poverty Rate on Hours Worked 
 
 ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
Race 704.9 <0.0001 
L_Ethnicity 3.5   0.0627 
Age 820 <0.0001 
Education 6.6   0.0105 
Gender 435.9 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Median Income 23.8 <0.0001 
Ramsey Co. Poverty Rate 81.9 <0.0001 
monthcount 1130.2 <0.0001 
a = 0.01 
 
 In order to understand the significance suggested by the ANOVA table, the 
unstandardized coefficients of the fixed effects convey the impact of each of these 
variables on work hours (see Table 5.13).  
 
Table 5.13. Fixed Effects: 
Median Income and Poverty Rate in Ramsey County on Hours Worked 
 
Predictor 
Unstandardized 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient Std Error df t-value p-value 
Race AA 9.243217 0.03212852 354923 287.69676 0.0000 
Race AP 1.346988 0.03242077 34027 41.54705 0.0000 
Race MR -0.128951 0.08747746 34027 -1.47411 0.1405 
Race N -0.450779 0.07919142 34027 -5.69227 0.0000 
Race U 0.068314 0.12223477 34027 0.55888 0.5763 
Race W -0.150528 0.02812289 34027 -5.35251 0.0000 
L_Ethnicity 0.117417 0.05224426 34027 2.24747 0.0246 
Age 0.021509 0.00131097 354923 16.40689 0.0000 
Education 0.065222 0.02125449 354923 3.06864 0.0022 
Gender -0.746053 0.02884342 34027 -29.86561 0.0000 
MedianIncome_RamseyCo 0.000015 0.00000304 354923 4.90062 0.0000 
PovertyRate_RamseyCo -0.054976 0.00379627 354923 -14.48163 0.0000 
monthcount 0.019753 0.00058755 354923 33.61915 0.0000 
a = 0.01 
 
Table 5.13 shows that when the median income increases, MFIP participants’ 
work hours increase. When the poverty rate increases, MFIP participants’ work hours 
decrease. Race is significant, but again, not for all race categories. As in the other models, 
African American/African Immigrant is the comparison race. According to the results, 
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Asian/Pacific Islanders work significantly more hours than African Americans, and 
Native Americans and Whites work significantly fewer hours. Those who identify as 
having multiple races or unknown races do not work significantly more or fewer hours 
than African Americans/African Immigrants when the economic predictor variables 
change. As with income, age is also significant; work hours increase as MFIP participants 
get older. Gender is also significant, as it is with income. Females report significantly 
fewer work hours than males do. Finally, monthcount is significant again; participants 
tend to work more hours during their later months on MFIP. 
 Time effects on hours worked. The time effects model replaces all economic 
indicator predictor variables with dummy coded year variables for time, as a means to 
examine the impact of time on MFIP participants’ work hours. It is a different way to 
consider trends over time, outside of economic conditions. The time effects model 
addresses the following question: to what extent does time, particularly the years covered 
in this study during which the United States experienced two recessions, influence MFIP 
participants’ employment opportunities in terms of work hours, after controlling for 
person-level differences (race, Latino ethnicity, gender, age, and education)? Table 5.14 
shows the ANOVA results for time effects. All years except 2001 show a significant time 
effect on MFIP participants’ work hours.  
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Table 5.14. ANOVA:  
Time Effects on Hours Worked 
 
 ANOVA F-test ANOVA p-value 
Race 746.0 <0.0001 
L_Ethnicity 4.8   0.0280 
Age 916.8 <0.0001 
Education 4.0   0.0443 
Gender 480.9 <0.0001 
Year 2001 0.0   0.8696 
Year 2002 28.5 <0.0001 
Year 2003 24.8 <0.0001 
Year 2004 38.5 <0.0001 
Year 2005 14.9   0.0001 
Year 2006 10.4   0.0013 
Year 2007 25.9 <0.0001 
Year 2008 8.2   0.0043 
Year 2009 9.5   0.0020 
Year 2010 29.2 <0.0001 
Year 2011 23.9 <0.0001 
Year 2012 23.0 <0.0001 
Year 2013 66.5 <0.0001 
Year 2014 8.4   0.0038 
Year 2015 11.8   0.0006 
Year 2016 24.0 <0.0001 
 a = 0.01 
Table 5.14 provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that time has a 
significant impact on predicting Ramsey County MFIP participants’ work hours. To 
examine whether each year shows growth or decline in work hours, the coefficients were 
graphed. Figure 5.5 shows the coefficient change in MFIP participants’ work hours. 
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Figure 5.5.  
 
 Figure 5.5 shows the coefficient change per year, and provides evidence of a time 
trend. The coefficients change the most from 2005-2006, and from 2006-2007. It is 
important to note that this is a graph of coefficient change, not the number of hours 
worked. The line does not show the direction of change; rather, the positive and negative 
signs to the left of the coefficients indicate whether there was growth or not. A coefficient 
above zero shows growth. For example, the perceived “drop” between 2006 and 2007 
actually shows that growth occurred, but at a much slower rate because the coefficient is 
still positive. The years between 2008 and 2013 show negative growth because the 
coefficients are negative. Figure 5.5 demonstrates the persistent, lasting effect of time on 
hours worked. It is consistent with what the mixed effects models with economic 
indicators as the predictor variables show. National recessions tend to have little impact 
at the time, and the local economy experiences lagging effects, for Ramsey County MFIP 
participants in particular, as the national economy begins to recover. 
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 Conclusions on findings. Chapter 5 presents the results of descriptive statistics 
and the final linear mixed effects regression models. Descriptive statistics show that 
MFIP participants who earn income do not greatly differ from the entire population. This 
indicates that the working and non-working participants are similar, and is evidence that 
many of those who are not earning income at one point, eventually do. 
 The main findings from the mixed effects models show that the condition of the 
national economy, as measured by a dummy variable based on NBER’s definition of a 
recession, have little impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn 
income, how much they earn, and how many hours they work. The condition of the local 
economy, as measured by the local real GDP, Ramsey County unemployment rate, 
Ramsey County median income, and Ramsey County poverty rate, does have a 
significant impact on MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours. In particular, as the 
local economy declines, Ramsey County MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours 
significantly decline. 
 In terms of the control predictor variables, race, age, and gender show 
significance in predicting both earnings and hours worked. Education is significant for 
earnings, but not hours worked. Latino ethnicity is not significant in predicting earnings 
or hours worked. The next chapter more closely examines what these findings mean. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
Federal welfare reform, and by extension state- and county-administered 
programs, aims to decrease dependence on government assistance by promoting labor 
market participation. Welfare reform contends that employment is a better alternative to 
public assistance, and it no doubt is, but it does not include stipulations that guard against 
slow economies, which greatly impact low-income families. At the turn of the 
millennium, Ziliak et al. (2000) and Blank (2002) surmised that it would be beneficial for 
welfare reform research to focus on the impact of economic cycles to consider welfare 
reform’s efficacy in the context of the greater economy, particularly since welfare reform 
encourages work as a means to achieve self-sufficiency. Now that twenty years of post-
PRWORA economic cycles data exists, this dissertation examines the degree to which 
Ramsey County MFIP participants’ employment opportunities are limited by both 
national and local economic conditions by asking the following question: to what extent 
do economic conditions, particularly those of the local economy, impact welfare reform 
participants’ employment opportunities in terms of earnings and hours worked? Findings 
indicate that although national recessions tend to have little impact at the time they are 
occurring, local economies experience lagging effects, to which Ramsey County MFIP 
participants are highly susceptible. This chapter closely examines what the findings of 
this study mean and connects them to previous research. 
Economic Conditions 
In the pre-welfare reform years, when AFDC was still the federal policy for 
means-tested public assistance, researchers suspected that a strong economy could 
 	 98 
potentially have a larger impact on the success of welfare-to-work programs than the 
programs themselves (Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, & Connelly, 2000). In the years following 
TANF’s inception, advocates on behalf of the poor suspected that the corresponding 
robust economy contributed to welfare reform’s declining caseloads (Danziger, 
Weiderspan, and Douglas-Siegal, 2013). Several researchers agree that the economy 
plays a larger role than proponents of welfare reform may want to acknowledge. This 
dissertation provides evidence to support the speculations that economic conditions do, in 
fact, influence employment opportunities for welfare reform participants, particularly in 
Ramsey County, Minnesota. 
This dissertation asks, to what extent do economic conditions, particularly those 
of the local economy, impact welfare reform participants’ employment opportunities in 
terms of earnings and hours worked? Findings indicate that the lagging impacts of 
national recessions, such as increased unemployment and poverty, significantly affect 
welfare reform participants; however, it takes several months once a national recession 
begins for this locality to experience the consequences. If the condition of the national 
economy and the condition of the local economy followed trends parallel to each other, 
real GDP for the metro area closest to Ramsey County (Minneapolis-St. Paul-
Bloomington, MN-WI), would decrease in the months leading to a national recession; 
however, it remained stable during the March – December 2001 recession; during the 
Great Recession of 2007 – 2009, it began to decrease as the national recession was 
ending, then dropped quite a bit, and then started to increase again a few months after the 
Great Recession ended. This is evidence that Minnesota, particularly the metropolitan 
area of Minneapolis-St. Paul lags behind the nation in experiencing the impact of a 
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national recession, and therefore, it makes sense that a national recession would have 
little immediate impact on MFIP participants in Ramsey County. 
Previous research suggests a strong need for a closer examination of the 
economy’s role in promoting self-sufficiency for welfare reform participants (Blank, 
2000). Given that TANF is a federal program but administered at the state and local 
levels, it is imperative to consider local economic conditions specific to states and 
counties when analyzing the impact of economic conditions. For this study, economic 
indicators that reflect the condition of the local economy are better predictors for MFIP 
participants’ earnings and work hours than national recessions. The real GDP of the 
metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul, median income, rising unemployment rates, 
and rising poverty rates are all significantly linked to Ramsey County MFIP participants’ 
earnings and work hours. As real GDP and median income increase, evidence of a 
growing economy, MFIP participants’ earnings and hours increase. As unemployment 
and poverty increase, evidence of a shrinking economy, MFIP participants’ earnings and 
work hours decrease. It is possible that there are fewer jobs available in the formal labor 
market when the economy is slow, particularly for jobs that rely on consumers to 
purchase goods and services. During recessions, if people in the general population 
reduce their spending on nonessential items and services (for example, dining out), there 
may not be as many of these jobs available for MFIP participants who tend to have less 
education and fewer job skills, and are often employed part time, in jobs that do not offer 
unemployment insurance, as in service sector industries. Furthermore, with less work 
available from the formal labor market, it is possible that during times of economic 
downturns, participants are earning income from informal work arrangements and not 
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reporting it, which means the data may show fewer participants have income than what is 
actually happening; however, such jobs are unstable and are examples of what people 
need to do in order to survive when the economy falters, jobs disappear, and services 
inadequately address their needs and challenges. These findings support what Danziger, 
Weiderspan, and Douglas-Siegal (2013) assert: that there is a great need for stability in 
the job market for low-income workers, especially during recessions. 
Race, Age, Education, and Gender 
This research clearly indicates that local economic conditions impact MFIP 
participants in Ramsey County. Additionally, it shows that person differences have a 
significant impact on MFIP participants’ employment opportunities in terms of earnings 
and work hours, regardless of economic conditions, but do not have the same impact 
across all person-level predictors. In general, the person differences affect earnings more 
so than they affect hours. This could reflect that people work similar numbers of hours, 
but do not necessarily earn the same for the for working the same amount of time. This 
section details the impact of the person-level predictor variables, linking findings to 
previous research. 
 Race. Existing research clearly shows that African Americans are among the most 
disadvantaged welfare reform participants (Hollister et al., 2003; McDonnell, 2004; 
DeMaster, 2009; Kwon & Meyer, 2011; Minnesota Department of Human Services, 
2011; Sheely, 2012; Collins & Xaykaothao; 2015). In this research, race is a significant 
predictor for both earnings and hours, but not in the same way for both. Due to the strong 
evidence that African Americans in particular experience considerable discrimination, 
African American/African Immigrant is used as the comparison race group for this study. 
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Findings show that Asian/Pacific Islanders earn and work significantly more hours than 
African Americans/African Immigrants. Native Americans earn and work significantly 
less than African Americans/African Immigrants. Whites’ earnings do not significantly 
differ from African Americans’/African Immigrants’, but they work significantly fewer 
hours. These significances are constant across models, regardless of the economic 
conditions predictor variables in each model. Given that African Americans/African 
Immigrants are over-represented on MFIP in Ramsey County more than any other race 
group (42.6% of Ramsey County MFIP participants compared to 12.0% of Ramsey 
County (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016)), that past research has found more evidence of 
racial disparities particularly for African American MFIP participants, and that the results 
of this research that indicate they earn less than at least one other racial group is 
disconcerting. Additionally, given that White participants’ earning are similar to African 
American/African Immigrants’ but they work significantly fewer hours indicates that 
White participants earn more per hours worked. The models in this research assume that 
there are no interactions between the predictor variables, and therefore do not provide the 
full impact race may have on earnings and hours. For example, there could be an 
interaction between race and gender that these models do not show. Furthermore, 
research using transformed data can only provide distorted interpretations of the results; 
rather than conclude that race is less significant than it is, the results of this research as 
they pertain to race are at best, significant in unknown ways, and at worst, inconclusive. 
It is also important to note that these results are specific to MFIP participants in Ramsey 
County, and covers a 17-year period. Looking at smaller periods of time may provide a 
more nuanced understanding of how employment opportunities vary depending on race; 
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more research is needed to understand its relative impact. Finally, it is essential to 
understand that race is self-reported by participants, and that employers have their own 
biases. If someone appears to belong to a particular racial group to an employer, even if 
that person does not identify as such, s/he could be subject to discrimination in ways that 
this study cannot capture. 
 Age. To be consistent with previous research that controls for age (Kwon & 
Meyer, 2011; Hanratty, 2016), this study includes age as a predictor control variable. 
Given that the aforementioned studies control for age and use different statistical methods 
(generalized estimating equation regression models, and Cox proportional hazard models, 
respectively), and that mixed effects models do not distinguish between control and 
predictor variables, the findings on age are interpreted differently for this study. Age is a 
significant predictor in both models that use both earnings and hours worked as response 
variables. In general, as MFIP participants age, their income and hours increase 
significantly. The models cannot say how much income and hours increase for every year 
participants age, but age does appear to be an important factor in employment 
opportunities. Younger MFIP participants could still be finishing high school or a GED 
instead while working part time and reporting fewer hours than those who are older, and 
their reduced hours could be impacting the age variable; however, they make up about 
4% of the population, and of the parents under age 18, only 14.6% of them report 
earnings. As participants age, so do their children; the presence of young children in the 
home may impact the amount MFIP parents may work, so it is reasonable to conclude 
that age contributes to more work opportunities simply because children may need less 
 	103 
supervision, participants have more time to work, and have gained more experience and 
transferable skills for better paying jobs. 
Education. Previous research on welfare reform outcomes, particularly in 
Minnesota, shows that education plays a major role in determining the welfare-to-work 
experience MFIP participants have; those with more education appear to have more 
success in the program (Hollister et al., 2003; McDonnell, 2004). In this research, results 
on education are slightly less clear than the other control predictor variables. In the 
models that use the national recession variable, real GDP for the metropolitan area of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, and the Ramsey County unemployment rate, education has a 
significant impact on earnings, but not work hours. These economic indicators show that 
earnings increase significantly for those who have a high school diploma or a GED; 
however, work hours do not significantly increase with a high school education. This 
may demonstrate that more education, at least having graduated from high school or 
obtained a GED, may increase earnings, but not hours; thus, with more education, people 
earn more per hour. In the models that use the median income for Ramsey County and 
the poverty rate for Ramsey County, education has a significant impact on both earnings 
and hours. Rather than deem the impact of education ambiguous based on these results, it 
is noteworthy that having a high school degree accounts for higher income in three of the 
four models run. 
Gender. Although the majority of MFIP participants are female, throughout 
history, women have been economically disadvantaged, especially when turning to 
government assistance for a financial safety net in trying circumstances (Abramovitz, 
1996; Abramovitz, 2000; Abramovitz, 2001, Brush, 2003; Mink & Solinger, 2003). This 
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research supports what others have found regarding gender, that females tend to have 
more difficulties in maintaining earnings and work hours sufficient to support a family. 
Findings from this dissertation show that gender is a significant predictor for Ramsey 
County MFIP participants’ earnings and hours. Despite females comprising three-
quarters of this population, they earn significantly less than males do, as evidenced by all 
models run in the analyses. Females also work significantly fewer hours than males work. 
At its original inception, ACD was intended to help single mothers, and the results of this 
study show that TANF, its current successor, is still not adequately addressing their needs 
or providing enough employment opportunities to move them out of a system that 
appears to be biased against them. Low-income, single mothers face unique obstacles in 
moving into work. Childcare needs to be affordable, close, and open during hours that 
support women who have unpredictable work schedules. As primary care-givers for their 
children (and overrepresented as heads of single-parent families in this study), they are 
responsible for raising them and making sure their basic needs are met, and are often 
forced to choose between working to support them and staying home with them to raise 
them; choosing the latter means they often turn to public assistance as a way to provide 
basic necessities. If, as these results indicate, women on MFIP earn less and work fewer 
hours, they are at a significant disadvantage for moving from welfare to work. 
Furthermore, as Brush (2003) points out, welfare reform law generates difficulties for 
single mothers who are trying to balance earning income with family responsibilities by 
not affording them the opportunity to decide whether working outside of the home or 
staying at home with their children is the best option for their families. 
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This dissertation provides a contemporary contribution to research done at the 
turn of the millennium, when TANF was less than a decade old. Previous research 
implores those who analyze social welfare policy to seriously consider economic 
conditions in future studies of welfare reform, long before enough time had passed to 
examine the impact of economic fluctuations on welfare reform participants (Blank, 
2002). This research utilizes a seventeen-year time period, during which the United States 
experienced two recessions, and finds that when the local economy is experiencing the 
lagging impact of national economic recessions, especially in terms of increased poverty 
and unemployment rates, employment opportunities are significantly reduced for MFIP 
participants in Ramsey County. In light of these findings, the next chapter offers 
suggestions for how policy can respond and help members of society who, without a 
sufficient financial safety net, are more apt to struggle in times of economic downturns. 
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Chapter 7 
Implications 
 As the United States experiences inevitable ebbs and flows in economic 
conditions, it is imperative to remember that the impact of a recession is 
disproportionately felt among lower-income families, who in times of financial crisis, 
have little to no safety net of their own, and who, despite working hard or trying hard to 
find work, cannot make ends meet when hours are reduced or lay-offs occur, and cannot 
find work when opportunities retreat as a result of the larger economy. Ample research 
exists on the impact of recessions, particularly the Great Recession of 2007 – 2009; for 
example, Krosch and Amodio (2014) examine perceptions of race during and in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, Farber (2012) looks at unemployment in conjunction 
with the housing market crash, and Christensen (2015) critically examines the Great 
Recession’s impact on women, especially women of color. This dissertation fills a gap in 
the literature by focusing specifically on the impact of the recession on very low-income 
families.  
Given what previous research and this dissertation collectively show regarding the 
obstacles welfare reform participants face in precarious financial times, social welfare 
advocates, researchers, and policy makers need to be asking what can be done to address 
the needs of the most economically disadvantaged families, especially when the economy 
falters. The final chapter of this dissertation explores possibilities for improving the way 
existing policies address the needs of low-income families, especially during hard 
economic times when wealthier families can rely on their own resources until a recession 
ends. 
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Policy Implications Considering Economic Indicator Predictors 
This dissertation is most concerned with the extent to which economic conditions 
impact welfare reform participants’ work opportunities; the answer to its research 
question is that local economic conditions play a significant role in Ramsey County 
MFIP participants’ earnings and work hours. Researchers at the beginning of the 
millennium called for examinations of how economic conditions affect low-income 
families (Ziliak et al., 2000; Blank, 2002). As years passed and TANF research faded into 
the background, social welfare advocates repeatedly called for more research to examine 
its efficacy (Sheely, 2012; Kwon & Meyer, 2013). This dissertation answers those calls 
and provides evidence for changing welfare policy such that the program’s goals are 
more in line with realistic opportunities, given local economic conditions. Federal 
welfare reform expects work from its participants, without regard to economic 
conditions; it requires participants to find and maintain employment, but does not provide 
adequate work opportunities when the local economy declines. If opportunities were 
sufficient, the results of this research would not show a significant decrease in income 
and work hours during times when the local economy is slow. This section describes the 
federal government’s response to the Great Recession’s impact on TANF participants, 
and the section that follows offers suggestions for alternatives to solely focusing on 
TANF when recessions occur.  
Federal government’s response to the Great Recession: ARRA. Under the 
American Recover and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, the federal government 
introduced the TANF Emergency Contingency Fund, which allowed states to apply for 
emergency funds to supplement state-administered TANF programs to help states fund 
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cash assistance for increased caseloads, subsidized employment programs, and other 
programs that align with TANF’s goals (such as those that aim to reduce teen pregnancies 
and out-of-wedlock births) (Public Law 111-5). It is important to point out that these 
contingency funds were not entitlements, automatically granted to states. Were these 
funds sufficient to offset the impact of the Great Recession? Haskins, Albert, and Howard 
(2014) provide evidence that that they did, indeed, have a considerable and positive 
impact on TANF families during and after the Great Recession, particularly in 
Minnesota, which, according to their report, experienced lower increases in 
unemployment and lower caseload increases than many other states. The findings from 
this dissertation suggest that this was not the case for Ramsey County MFIP participants. 
Furthermore, the 2014 Minnesota Legislature developed a task force to examine TANF’s 
impact on Minnesota families and make recommendations for policy improvements, 
which is evidence that Minnesota’s welfare reform policy stakeholders were skeptical of 
the federal government’s response to helping TANF families during the Great Recession 
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2015). The task force calls attention to an 
alarming fact: “In 1986, the cash grant provided families with a cash resource that met 
approximately 70 percent of the federal poverty level. Today, the MFIP cash grant is only 
worth 32 percent of the federal poverty level, far below the federal definition of deep 
poverty, which is 50 percent of federal poverty guidelines” (Minnesota Department of 
Human Services, 2015, p. 5). Their recommendations include increasing the cash grant to 
reflect inflation and cost of living increases, create programming that addresses building 
assets and increased financial literacy, increase opportunities to enhance job skills and 
further education, and remove child support as well as income from training as earnings 
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that count against the cash grant (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2015). 
Although all of these recommendations are reasonable and, if implemented as suggested, 
have considerable potential to improve the quality of life for MFIP participants, the 
current legislative branch, especially at the federal level, is not likely to favor them. 
This dissertation provides evidence that ARRA was not a sufficient response to 
the Great Recession for Ramsey County MFIP participants, and recommends moving 
beyond TANF to address the needs of low income families during times of recessions. 
Other policies that indirectly target TANF participants could have a larger impact on their 
lives in political climates that do not favor increased funding for TANF.  The next two 
sections offer suggestions for policy reform alternative to changing or expanding TANF.   
Policy changes not limited to welfare reform. Recommendations made in 
previous research center around extending TANF contingency funding (Sheely, 2012; 
Kwon & Meyer, 2011), but they should not stop there. States are limited by federal 
requirements, but are given liberty to use state dollars to more fully address the needs of 
their welfare reform participants. MFIP does, in fact, acknowledge unique hardships its 
participants experience, and through a combination of using state dollars to fund 
programs, particularly Family Stabilization Services, and a multitude of exemption 
categories, addresses these challenges prior to requiring employment. However, it is 
unrealistic to expect one program, even in conjunction with other programs like it, such 
as housing and child care subsidies, to sufficiently address the needs of low-income 
families. Given that MFIP participants are particularly vulnerable to changing local 
economic conditions, policy reform efforts should not be limited to welfare reform; at the 
very least, the 60-month lifetime limit to receive cash assistance should be disregarded 
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during recessions (Kwon & Meyer, 2011), and sanction policies should be modified 
during slow economic times so that when jobs become harder to find, low-income 
families are not further penalized for not complying with Employment Services.  
Rather than only targeting MFIP programs and services, program creation should 
be done in conjunction with reform efforts that focus on higher level employment policy. 
If the goal is to depend on work rather than welfare, jobs need to provide elements that 
foster long term self-sufficiency. Moving MFIP participants into work with wages that 
put them just above the eligibility threshold is not a viable solution to the issue of welfare 
dependency. The answer is not simply to create more jobs or to increase the job readiness 
of MFIP participants; instead, employers and corporations need to be held accountable 
for providing sustainable employment opportunities for low-income families. 
Understanding that this could be a challenge in the private employment sector, reform 
efforts should target laws that private employers are expected to uphold. For example, 
small businesses (those that employ fewer than 50 people) are not held to the same 
employee protection laws as their large business counterparts. Increasing government-
subsidized grants or loans to small business owners to help offset the costs of complying 
with stricter employment laws may be a more politically acceptable approach in the 
current political climate. Constituents may be more likely to support efforts to help small 
businesses than to increase welfare spending. Emphasizing community engagement by 
supporting small employers and by lifting their employees away from poverty could 
reduce poverty while upholding TANF’s objective to promote work. 
More laws should be created and enforced that foster job security and that protect 
part time workers, such as paid sick time, no punitive action taken against parents who 
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call in to address the needs of their children, onsite childcare, and possibilities for moving 
into full time work. Policy changes outside of welfare reform are necessary to address the 
needs of the most economically vulnerable MFIP participants and ultimately provide 
them with the financial security necessary to withstand a changing economy. 
Policy Implications Considering Significant, Person-Level Predictors   
 In addition to economic indicators predicting significant declines in earnings and 
work hours for Ramsey County MFIP participants, this research reflects what past 
research shows in terms of employment opportunities being significantly impacted by 
race, gender, and education (Brush, 2003; Hollister et al., 2003; McDonnell, 2004; 
DeMaster, 2009); therefore, efforts to reform both welfare and employment policies 
should be particularly concerned with increasing opportunities for women and minorities. 
Previous research recommends giving a voice to welfare reform program participants in 
terms of service improvement (Danziger, Wiederspan, & Douglas-Siegel, 2013). One 
way to do this would be to give participants, particularly single mothers and minority 
mothers, a voice in such reform efforts, which could lead to increased understanding by 
employers of the notable challenges single mothers with young children face. 
Although the best starting point would be focusing on policy changes to welfare 
reform at the federal level such that laws include opportunities to resolve the conflicting 
objectives between full time parenting and employment, simultaneously targeting both 
welfare reform laws and employment laws may yield better outcomes for welfare reform 
participants. For example, one option would be to increase tax incentives for employers 
who pay their employees a livable wage rather than the minimum wage, who provide 
flexible hours for single mothers, and who offer benefits for part time workers. Another 
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option is for stricter consequences to be imposed on employers who practice racial and 
gender discrimination, including loss of federal and state business subsidies.  
This research, like Hollister et al.’s (2003) research, also provides substantial 
evidence for continuing to support educational endeavors of welfare participants. 
Advocacy must continue for young parents who have not yet completed high school. 
Ramsey County already does this with its teen parent program; however, once 
participants turn 18, they have the option to stop attending high school and go to work. At 
the very least, more resources should go toward helping them finish school. Furthermore, 
policy could also help employers support efforts to finish high school degrees while 
working. For example, employers could be given government-subsidized financial 
incentives if they offer paid time off so employees may study for exams, and if they offer 
raises to employees who obtain a high school degree while working. The reform 
suggestions given do require subsidies from state and federal governments; however, they 
may have more political appeal if they do not focus on welfare reform.  
This study clearly suggests that the condition of the local economy, race, age, 
gender, and education are significant factors in predicting employment opportunities for 
Ramsey County MFIP participants. These findings may serve as ground work for 
analyzing subsets of this dataset or datasets from other counties in Minnesota to further 
delve into how local economic conditions impact a very diverse population in various 
ways.    
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 No research design is without limitations, and limitations provide avenues for 
future research. The researcher fully acknowledges the limitations of this study, knowing 
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that these are the only data available on MFIP participants in Ramsey County, and 
recognizing the challenges in trying to analyze data on a very diverse population, for 
whom averages cannot provide a complete picture of their lives.  
A major limitation of this research concerns the lack of a literal interpretation of 
the results; using transformed data corrects for non-linearity, but curtails meaning. 
Results are limited to stating whether or not economic indicators and person differences 
are significant; they cannot give comparison estimates, as in saying that MFIP 
participants work a particular number of hours more during robust economies than during 
recessions, or that males are a certain amount more likely than females to report earnings.   
The results show that MFIP participants in Ramsey County are vulnerable to local 
economic conditions. However, when interpreting the effects of the control predictors on 
income and work hours, it is unknown if person-level effects would be different during 
recessions because the models assume there is no interaction between any of them and 
the economic indicator predictors. To clarify, females earn significantly less than males, 
regardless of economic conditions. The models cannot say if recessions impact females 
differently than males. Future research should consider interactions between the control 
predictors and the economic indicator predictors, and test for differences in how 
recessions impact females and males, and how they impact different race categories. 
Another direction for future research would be to compare the demographics of welfare 
caseloads during times of recessions to demographics during robust economies. 
The measure used for the national recession variable and those used to measure 
local economic conditions are not the same. The national recession variable, 
Recession_or_Not, reflects NBER’s declaration of the monthly state of the economy, but 
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does not provide insight into lagging impacts at the national level, such as the national 
unemployment rate and national poverty rate. Future research may want to measure 
national and local economic conditions with the same type of variable to determine 
whether national economic conditions, as measured by lagging recession indicators, have 
a similar impact on welfare participants in a particular locality. This research was 
particularly concerned with Ramsey County’s economic conditions in the context of the 
national economy, when it was in a definitive recession; future research should consider 
lagging indicators at multiple levels: county, state, and national, as another way to study a 
complex issue.  
Trying to fit statistical models to complex human and social contexts is inherently 
problematic because of the dubious idea of a normal distribution existing in nature, and 
therefore the social sciences. While applied statistical models, like linear mixed effects 
models, are sophisticated enough to account for individual variations by providing a way 
to analyze nested data, they assume a normal distribution and a linear relationship 
between the response and predictor variables. Using linear mixed effects models on data 
with skewed response variables (as in this MAXIS dataset, in which zero income and 
zero hours skew the data) becomes complicated. If normality and linearity are not 
reflected in the data, transformations may be utilized such that the model assumptions are 
met and the model can therefore produce useful results. However, there is debate among 
statisticians and social scientists regarding the advantages of transforming data. Singer 
and Willett (2003) recommend it over using non-linear models; Lo and Andrews (2015) 
recommend against it, and prefer employing highly complex generalized linear mixed 
effects models so as to avoid implications transformed data creates when interpreting the 
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results. In this case, results are less generalizable because they no longer apply to those 
who do not earn income or report work hours.  
This study has considerable statistical power due to the fact it includes all persons 
on which inferences are drawn; however, there is so much variation between participants 
that the results become less generalizable to everyone as an individual. Data collected 
from people experiencing a wide range of challenges unique to themselves, their families, 
or a small subset of the population to which they belong is brimming with variation. 
Variation is important, and should be expected in a population as diverse as MFIP 
participants; however, future research may benefit from analyzing subsets of the 
population, compared to the population as a whole. Furthermore, with regard to social 
science research, Speelman and McGann (2013) posit that “[t]here are so many variables, 
often interacting in non-linear ways, that generalization to the individual simply cannot 
be a reasonable aim of the discipline” (p. 8). This is not to discount decades of research; 
it is merely to acknowledge that caution should be practiced when interpreting any results 
that use averages to describe a particular group of people, particularly very vulnerable 
members of the population. 
It is clear from this research that MFIP participants do not progress through the 
program in a linear way. Some will earn enough income such that they no longer need 
cash assistance; they will report this as required, and will transition off MFIP assistance. 
These are the participants whose MFIP experiences are easiest to analyze, but whose 
experiences are not generalizable to many MFIP participants. Some MFIP participants 
will find work, decide not to report it, and have their grants sanctioned for not complying 
with Employment Services. Many will move to different counties or states. Others may 
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opt out of MFIP because they no longer want to be a part of a system that requires them 
to report work activity to Financial Workers and Employment Counselors, and they will 
leave MFIP even if they do not have a job and are still technically eligible for benefits. 
Family composition could change such that another adult’s income eliminates the need 
for MFIP, and it could change again but former participants may not reapply.  MFIP 
participants who find themselves in the latter types of circumstances are the families to 
whom the results of this research should be cautiously applied. 
Although this study includes five person-level variables to account for differences 
in employment opportunities, there are many other factors in addition to race, Latino 
ethnicity, age, gender, and education that could account for differences in earned income 
and work hours. During the descriptive statistics process, the researcher identified other 
potentially confounding variables that are not included in the analysis: immigration 
status, having a young child in the house, and family composition (i.e. single- or two-
parent families). Because these in particular were not identified as such until descriptive 
statistics on these data suggested they may impact the results, and due to the fact that it is 
not possible for one study to account for all potentially confounding variables, and given 
that these in particular were missing for many participants, they were not included in this 
analysis. 
Descriptive statistics showed that approximately 18.1% of the 53,007 participants 
in this population are immigrants. Due to the high percentage MFIP participants who are 
immigrants, whose employment history and other factors may impact employment 
opportunities, future research should take immigration status into account. For this 
research, immigration status prior to October 2006 (January 2000 until September 2006) 
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is underrepresented because the data were extracted from a data warehouse that did not 
collect immigration data prior to October 2006. Even after identifying participants who 
did not have an immigration entry date associated with their IDs prior to October 2006, 
but did have one after that date, immigrants who entered and exited MFIP prior to 
October 2006 are not identified, and immigrants in general are underrepresented. Given 
that the underrepresentation covers approximately 40% of the time this study covers, it 
was not possible to accurately account for immigration status. Future studies should use 
data that contains immigration status because being an immigrant (especially a new 
immigrant) could have a major impact on employment opportunities. 
To be consistent with previous research on similar populations (see Hanratty, 
2016), future research should account for having young children in the household; in 
particular, if a participant has a child under age 1, s/he may be exempt from Employment 
Services, not expected to report income or work hours, and therefore report less. Data for 
this study are limited in that they only provide the age of the youngest child in the house, 
so families with several young children will look the same in this dataset as those with 
one young child. Descriptive statistics showed that at any given point during the 17-year 
period of this study, approximately 59% of the 53,007 MFIP participants in this 
population have a child under age one year old. Of those who have a child under age one, 
approximately 32% of them take exemptions from Employment Services; the majority of 
MFIP parents with children under age one are active in Employment Services. 
Approximately 78% have a child under age five years old. Given the high percentages of 
having young children in the house, and that this could have unique implications for 
working in terms of child care and parenting commitments that may not be present for 
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older children, future research should consider how having young children in the home 
affects employment opportunities. 
Family composition, in terms of whether a family has one or two parents, should 
also be accounted for in future research due to possible variation in employment 
opportunities between single- and two-parent families. Descriptive statistics showed that 
approximately 75% of the MFIP participants in this data are single parents. When 
considering family composition over time, the percent of single-parent families ranges 
from approximately 70% (May 2006) to 79% (June 2000). However, for this study, data 
extraction criteria specified MFIP-eligible adults; thus, families with two parents in 
which one is ineligible for MFIP would appear as single-parent families in this data. 
Families in which there is only one MFIP-eligible parent and either another co-parent or 
adult caregiver are underrepresented; it is likely that less than 75% of the families in this 
study are single-parent families. Data were extracted to reflect the employment 
requirements of welfare reform, but future research of this type should consider family 
composition as a control variable because hours and income for families in which there 
are two MFIP-eligible parents may differ from single-parent families, given that the work 
requirements are different for two-parent families. Furthermore, the presence of another 
adult in the home may impact MFIP-eligible parents’ employment situations due the 
extra help in terms of child care and other support an additional adult could provide (D. 
DeMaster, personal communication, May 31, 2017). 
 Another limitation of this study is that it does not take into consideration multiple, 
discrete periods of MFIP participation, or “spells” to account for the cyclical nature of 
MFIP use. Those who cycle in and out of the program are included in the analyses; 
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however, all MFIP participants appear to have only one spell in the models, which is not 
an accurate reflection of MFIP utilization because many participants exit and need to 
reapply at some point. In this dataset, the average number of MFIP spells is two. Future 
research should include MFIP spells in analysis, perhaps with a third level of nesting 
(time nested in individuals, nested in MFIP spells) to address recurring MFIP 
participation. Another possibility for analysis would be to consider using Cox 
proportional hazard models to examine the extent to which recessions contribute to MFIP 
applications and re-applications (for an example, see Hanratty, 2016).  
Finally, this research has limited external validity. It cannot be generalized to 
states other than Minnesota, and Minnesota counties outside of Ramsey County. 
However, because of using population data rather than a sample of the population, it may 
be useful to Ramsey County as programs change and become more tailored to meet the 
unique needs of MFIP participants. Furthermore, other counties in Minnesota may benefit 
from the knowledge gained by this research and accordingly modify their own programs. 
To increase external validity, at least in terms of Minnesota, future research should 
compare Ramsey County with other Minnesota counties, particularly those close to 
Ramsey County, because many MFIP participants live in one county but work in a 
different county. Future research should consider the extent to which work opportunities 
diminish such that low-income workers need to look outside the counties in which they 
live to find employment. 
Conclusion 
 TANF itself and its Minnesota counterpart MFIP assume linearity. The main 
eligibility criterion is income; in order to be eligible, one must have little to no income at 
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the time of application. The program is designed to move participants from welfare 
income to work income, and assumes this is the progression most participants take. While 
this is true for some, it is not the case for an unknown percentage of MFIP participants. 
 Although this study contributes to a growing body of research that suspects the 
economy plays a crucial role in terms of helping participants transition from welfare to 
work, and shows that local economic conditions do significantly impact MFIP 
participants’ earning and work hours, more research is needed to assess the extent to 
which economic conditions impact MFIP participants who are not working. With more 
knowledge in this area, policymakers and service providers may be able to restructure 
programming and tailor services to better meet the needs of participants despite 
fluctuating economic conditions. Furthermore, such understanding may lead to 
programming that seeks to end poverty rather than welfare dependence. Although many 
people exit welfare with jobs, they remain in poverty (Mallon & Stevens, 2011); the 
United States needs a social welfare program that can withstand the effects of changing 
economic conditions while addressing the challenges specific to those most in need of 
financial support.  
In all of its inceptions, from ADC to AFDC to TANF, public assistance takes 
punitive measures to address so-called welfare dependency, and leaves many people 
behind. Perhaps it is time to learn from the past, reform welfare reform, and create a true 
anti-poverty program, one that defines the problem as poverty rather than dependence, 
and provides security during unstable economic times for the most economically 
vulnerable members of society. Devolution may be here to stay; as recessions at the 
national level begin, states and counties should prepare by proactively upholding the 
 	121 
“opportunities” part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 and taking steps to ensure welfare participants in their 
localities have equal employment prospects across time, whether there is a recession or 
not. 
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Appendix A: Testing for Assumptions of Linear Mixed Effects Models 
(Earned Income and Work Hours) 
 
EarnedIncome: 
 
 
 
MAXISHours: 
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The residual plots of the transformed data still show a straight, diagonal line, 
which is evidence of a floor effect, meaning that many people are reporting similar 
income (as in minimum wage). Although the residual plot of the transformed data still 
contains this line, this likely represents individual participants who do not fit particularly 
well with the model, rather showing that the entire dataset does not fit. Given the 
complexity of MFIP participants’ lives and the potential for non-linear fluctuations in 
income, it makes sense that a model which assumes a linear progression of earning 
income would not fit all MFIP participants. However, the residual plots and Q-Q plots 
show that in general, the models using transformed data are a good fit. 
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Appendix B: Testing for Assumptions of Linear Mixed Effects Models 
(All Participants) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The residual plot and Q-Q plots for the dataset that includes all MFIP participants, 
including those earning zero income, are clearly not linear or normal; models run on the 
economy’s impact on whether or not Ramsey County MFIP participants earn income 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 	138 
Appendix C: R Code for Null Models 
 
The null models test for between-person variation in EarnedIncome and 
MAXISHours, with a fixed intercept (g00, specified by ~ 1), and a random intercept at the 
person level (u0j, specified by “random = ~ 1 | MAXIS_PersonId), with “~ 1” 
representing the 0 in u0j, and MAXIS_PersonId representing uj.  
 
null_mod <- lme(I(sqrt(EarnedIncome)) ~ 1, random = ~ 1 | MAXIS_PersonId, data = 
null_data_final[null_data_final$EarnedIncome>0,], na.action = na.exclude, correlation = 
corAR1()) 
summary(null_mod) 
VarCorr(null_mod) 
 
null_mod_a <- lme(I(sqrt(MAXISHours)) ~ 1, random = ~ 1 | MAXIS_PersonId, data = 
null_data_final_a[null_data_final_a$MAXISHours>0,], na.action = na.exclude, correlation = 
corAR1()) 
summary(null_mod_a) 
VarCorr(null_mod_a) 
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Appendix D: R Code for Conditional Models 
The left side of the models (left of the first “ ~ ”) show the response variable 
(I(sqrt(EarnedIncome)) and (I(sqrt(MAXISHours)). Predictor variables and random 
effects are on the right side of the models. All models are two-level mixed effects models 
that predict the linear mixed effects of the square root of EarnedIncome and 
MAXISHours as a function of all person-level and economic indicator variables, specifies 
a random slope monthcount, and a random intercept at the participant level, specifies two 
levels of nesting (time, as measured by monthcount, nested in MAXIS_PersonId (random 
= ~ 1 + monthcount | MAXIS_PersonId), and has an AR1 covariance structure. 
 
EarnedIncome_conditional_1 <- lme(I(sqrt(EarnedIncome)) ~ Race + CollapsedEthn01 + 
I(ReportAge - mean(ReportAge, na.rm=TRUE)) + HS_GED_or_NOT + CollapsedGender01 + 
Recession_or_Not + I(RealGDP_Metro - mean(RealGDP_Metro)) + I(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt - 
mean(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt)) + monthcount, data = 
MFIP_EI_all[MFIP_EI_all$EarnedIncome>0,], na.action = na.exclude, random = ~ 1 + 
monthcount | MAXIS_PersonId, correlation = corAR1()) 
 
MAXISHours_conditional_1 <- lme(I(sqrt(MAXISHours)) ~ Race + CollapsedEthn01 + 
I(ReportAge - mean(ReportAge, na.rm=TRUE)) + HS_GED_or_NOT + CollapsedGender01 + 
Recession_or_Not + I(RealGDP_Metro - mean(RealGDP_Metro)) + I(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt - 
mean(Ramsey_County_Unempl_Rt)) + monthcount, data = 
MFIP_EI_all[MFIP_EI_all$MAXISHours>0,], na.action = na.exclude, random = ~ 1 + monthcount 
| MAXIS_PersonId, correlation = corAR1()) 
 
EarnedIncome_conditional_2 <- lme(I(sqrt(EarnedIncome)) ~ Race + CollapsedEthn01 + 
I(ReportAge - mean(ReportAge, na.rm=TRUE)) + HS_GED_or_NOT + CollapsedGender01 + 
I(MedianIncome_RamseyCo - mean(MedianIncome_RamseyCo)) + I(PovertyRate_RamseyCo - 
mean(PovertyRate_RamseyCo)) + monthcount, data = 
MFIP_EI_all[MFIP_EI_all$EarnedIncome>0,], na.action = na.exclude, random = ~ 1 + 
monthcount | MAXIS_PersonId, correlation = corAR1()) 
 
MAXISHours_conditional_2 <- lme(I(sqrt(MAXISHours)) ~ Race + CollapsedEthn01 + 
I(ReportAge - mean(ReportAge, na.rm=TRUE)) + HS_GED_or_NOT + CollapsedGender01 + 
I(MedianIncome_RamseyCo - mean(MedianIncome_RamseyCo)) + I(PovertyRate_RamseyCo - 
mean(PovertyRate_RamseyCo)) + monthcount, data = MFIP_EI_all[MFIP_EI_all$MAXISHours>0,], 
na.action = na.exclude, random = ~ 1 + monthcount | MAXIS_PersonId, correlation = 
corAR1()) 
 
Time_Effects_MAXISHours <- lme(I(sqrt(MAXISHours)) ~ Race + CollapsedEthn01 + I(ReportAge 
- mean(ReportAge, na.rm=TRUE)) + HS_GED_or_NOT + CollapsedGender01 + year_2001 + 
year_2002 + year_2003 + year_2004 + year_2005 + year_2006 + year_2007 + year_2008 + 
year_2009 + year_2010 + year_2011 + year_2012 + year_2013 + year_2014 + year_2015 + 
year_2016, data = MFIP_EI_all[MFIP_EI_all$MAXISHours>0,], na.action = na.exclude, random 
= ~ 1 + monthcount | MAXIS_PersonId, correlation = corAR1()) 
